In 1855 Abraham Lincoln told a law student seeking advice, “The books, and your capacity for understanding them, are just the same in all places… Always bear in mind that your own resolution to succeed, is more important than any other one thing.”
I am Billy bob Bramscher and I am a victim of bullying, bad-faith investigation, malicious prosecution, vindictive prosecution, First Amendment Retaliation and multiple Civil Rights violations. On November, 29, 2010, while in Las Vegas, Nevada, I filed a formal complaint against Magistrate John Anthony Stipech, Westminster, Colorado Municipal Court, with the Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel #2010-3798 for multiple violations of my civil rights exercising and triggering the protection of the United States Federal Constitution and the “petitioning clause” of the First Amendment.
On January 4, 2011, while still in Las Vegas, Nevada, I was proactively sought by LVPD and sum six (6) undercover officers arrested me at my weekly rental in the morning. The arresting officer made the statement, “I do not know who you pissed-off but you pissed somebody off big-time.”
On February 18, 2011 it was scheduled for me to have a Preliminary Hearing to establish probable cause as guaranteed by United States Federal Constitution yet Public Defender Cathlin Matson motioned to have my competency determined stating “[Defendant] clearly does not have a rational or factual understanding of the charge, the penalties associated with the charge, nor will he allow counsel to discuss plea agreements or offers extended by the District Attorney.”
On July 5, 2011 my preliminary hearing is finally held and Rick Hernandez, Alternative Defense Counsel, is assigned to represent me yet never meets me before the court date of this important hearing. I am held over based on ZERO percent evidence…
Remember “write” above that Cathlin Matson, Public Defender, stated I did not have “a rational or factual understanding of the charge?” Well on October 13, 2011, my third (3rd) public defender Fran Simonet, Alternative Defense Counsel, apparently did not understand the charge as well as she motioned “To Dismiss Upon Lack of Jurisdiction and Lack of Specificity in Complaint and Information writing to the court, “[Defendant] is currently charged with one count of Retaliation Against a Judge pursuant to C.R.S. 18-8-615. The complaint and information does not specify which section of the statue the prosecution believes [Defendant] violated and without this information [Defendant] cannot effectively prepare his defense.”
On November 16, 2011 I was to finally have my day in court with a jury trial and Fran Simonet quits my case and I am forced to represent myself as my own attorney (pro se) and the trial is delayed.
On January 30, 2012 my trial started ending on February 6, 2012 and as my own lawyer (pro se) I was found “NOT GUILTY” by a jury of my peers. At this time, I was charged with C.R.S. 18-8-615 via 18-9-111(1)(e) and the mens rea was changed to “Specific Intent” instead of “Knowing” as incorrectly alleged for over thirteen (13) months…
When the evidence of a trial has been completed the jury is given instructions by the judge and these instructions include the Defendant’s Theory of Defense.
In my jury trial, the Defendant’s Theory of Defense, provided to the Jury:
“It is the Defendant’s theory of defense that the prosecution of this case was based upon retaliation by the City of Westminster. The Defendant contends that he was exercising his First Amendment rights of free speech and to redress grievances he had with the City of Westminster and that this prosecution is based on bad faith investigation, legal harassment and retaliation against him Defendant for exercising his First Amendment Rights.”
***The following information deals specifically with the fatal errors within the charging document also known as the “Complaint and Information”:
In criminal cases the accused has the Constitutional right, upon demand, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. On the Complaint and Information filed it ONLY states, “On or about November 29, 2010, [Defendant] unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly, as retaliation or retribution against John Stipech, a Judge who has served or is serving in a legal matter assigned to the Judge involving defendant or a person on whose behalf the defendant is acting, committed an act of harassment against or upon John Stipech, the Judge; in violation of section 18-8-615, C.R.S.”
John Anthony Stipech is NOT a Judge. In his public capacity, John Stipech is an attorney appointed as an officer of a municipality; albeit he has many duties involving the enforcement of law (see Colorado Court Rules for Magistrates, Chapter 35 C.R.M. 3, Rule 3. Definitions (a) “Magistrate: Any person other than a judge authorized by statute or by these rules to enter orders or judgments in judicial proceedings.”)
The mens rea of “knowingly” is a fatal error in the Complaint and Information. Both the terms “Retaliation” and “Retribution” by definition require intentional conduct (see CRS 18-1-503(4); 18-1-501(5); see also Adams County District Court No. 02CR3167, People v McIntier, 134 P3d 467 (Colo App 2005); see also Supreme Court of Colorado No. 05SC203 People v Manzo, Oct 2, 2006; see also Supreme Court of Colorado People v Hickman, 988 P2d 628, 644-45 (Colo 1999); see also United States v Houlihan, 937 F Supp 75,76 (D Mass 1996) whereas “intent to retaliate” in 18 USC 1513 requires proof either of “sole or abiding purpose” or “purpose mixed in with other purposes”; see also Welsher, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv L Rev 1097 (1952)).
The phrase “Act of Harassment” is unconstitutionally overbroad (see Supreme Court of Colorado Hickman, supra). The term “Harassment” is a “specific intent crime” (see United States v Tobin, 552 F3d 29,32 (1st Cir 2009) whereas although the word “intent” can often mean with “knowledge” that a particular result will follow, it sometimes instead requires a “purpose” to bring about a specific end); see also United States v Lampley, 573 F 2d 783 (3d Cir 1978) whereas 47 USC 223 obscene or harassing telephone calls requires that punishable conduct be made with the intent solely to harass; see also United States v Darsey, 342 F Supp 311 (Ed Pa 1972); see also 47 USC 223(a)(1)(e)).
Under the Federal Constitutions First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards (see National Endowment for the Arts v Finley, 524 US 569, 141 L Ed 500, 118 S Ct 2168, 98 Daily Journal DAR 6957, 1998 Colo J CAR 3222, 11 FLW FED S 675 (1998)).
The right to criticize public officials (see New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 273, II L Ed 2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964)) and to petition the government for a redress of grievances (see United Mine Workers v Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 US 217, 222, 19 L Ed 2d 426, 88 S Ct 353 (1967)) are protected activities and my activities and criticisms focused on matters of “Public Concern” as required by Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 75 L Ed 2d 708, 103 S Ct 1684 (1983) whereas “The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,” ID at 145 (see also Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484, 1 L Ed 2d 1498, 77 S Ct 1304, 14 OHIO Ops 2d 331 (1957)).