“I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up to what light I have.”
~Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of The United States of America EARTH
“Thousands of candles can be lighted from a single candle, and the life of the candle will not be shortened. Happiness never decreases by being shared.”
STORYLINE: August 31, 2013 I was sailing toward Joshua Tree National Park, California, with a car-camping stop from Lone Tree, Colorado, at HANGING LAKE within the Gem of Glenwood Canyon. Upon decent, I met Ernie – a self-described owner of River Rock which manufactures and sells cannabis – and his wife and a lady friend of theirs…
On this journey, I was heading west to Bhakti Fest to perform Maha Seva providing my second consecutive year of service for this Yoga, Dance and Music Festival! Be in the Bhav!!!
On 8/06/14, I, Billy bob Bramscher, did compose an EMAIL to T.J. Blair, Sergeant Internal Affairs Bureau in re various issues with this BAD-FAITH Investigation.
***CASE & CONTROVERSY***
I. Case 14GS000200 was DISMISSED according to LAW
The ADJUDICATED FACT of this matter is that this case was DISMISSED w/o PREJUDICE by this court on 2/11/14. The Denver City’s Attorney’s Office and its AGENTS however, with childish “Choose Your Own Adventure” reasoning, NEGLECTED to file the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CASE DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE within the TIME FRAME allowable under STATE and FEDERAL LAW!!! In the STATE OF COLORADO for any MOTION for RECONSIDERATION the DEFENDANT or the PROSECUTION has ONLY 35 DAYS and Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 KNOWINGLY filed their EVIL motion 74 DAYS or 2 MONTHS and 15 DAYS after Judge Johnny C. Barajas RULED!!!
One would not only consider, I believe, YET require Drinking and Driving Judge Johnny to HONORABLY disregard Vinny and Meg’s MOOT motion YET as previously recorded Johnny reinstated this case on 5/20/2014 MOTION GRANTED – CASE REINSTATED – ALESSI CASE CITED IS DISPOSITIVE. JCM/ERM.
Really… REALLY?1? Alessi v. Municipal Court in and for Canon City (1976)!!! WTF… Canon City is PRISON CITY, U.S.A. ROFLMBO!!! I agree that Marbury v. Madison established Judiciary Review YET this is absolutely ABSURD. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for the common-man YET for the Agent’s with the Denver City Attorney’s Office as well as the sitting JUDGE this behavior is CLEARLY SHOCKING and UNCONSTITUTIONAL and ESTABLISHES this CONSPIRACY!!!
COLORADO MUNICIPAL COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 30 COLORADO MUNICIPAL COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE
C.M.C.R. 237 (2014)
Rule 237. Appeals.
Appeals From Courts of Record. Appeals from courts of record shall be in accordance with Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure.
COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 29 COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ALL COURTS OF RECORD IN COLORADO
Colo. Crim. P. 37 (2014)
Rule 37. Appeals from County Court.
Filing Notice of Appeal and Docketing Appeal. The district attorney may appeal a question of law, and the defendant may appeal a judgment of the county court in a criminal action under simplified procedure to the district court of the county. To appeal the appellant shall, within 35 days after the date of entry of the judgment or the denial of posttrial motions, whichever is later, file notice of appeal in the county court, post such advance costs as may be required for the preparation of the record and serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon the appellee. He shall also, within such 35 days, docket the appeal in the district court and pay the docket fee. No motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment shall be required as a prerequisite to an appeal, but such motions if filed shall be pursuant to Rule 33(b) of these Rules.
II. This COURT fatally failed to acquire JURISDICTION
Sufficiency of information is matter of jurisdiction. See People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975).
COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 29 COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ALL COURTS OF RECORD IN COLORADO
III. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Colo. Crim. P. 7 (2014)
(1) An information shall be a written statement, signed by the prosecutor and filed in the court having jurisdiction over the offense charged, alleging that a person committed the criminal offense described therein.
(2) Requisites of the Information. The information shall be deemed technically sufficient and correct if it can be understood therefrom:
(I) That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense;
(II) That the defendant is identified therein, either by name or by the defendant’s patterned chemical structure of genetic information, or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant;
(III) That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is triable therein;
(IV) That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction.
But if information fails to charge crime, court acquires no jurisdiction. People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)
Verification of an information is required under this rule. Scott v. People, 176 Colo. 289, 490 P.2d 1295 (1971).
Rather, information is sufficient if it advises a defendant of the offense with which he is charged. Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).
And can be understood by the jury. An information is sufficient if the charge is in language from which the nature of the offense may be readily understood by the accused and jury. Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226, 176 P. 280 (1918); Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924); Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932); Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943); Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 F.2d 447 (1947); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972).
So that defendant can defend against it. An information is sufficient if it advises the accused of the charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend against it. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968); Perez v. People, 176 Colo. 505, 491 P.2d 969 (1971); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981).
And be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the charges he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973). People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003).
Dismissal if defendant not fairly and reasonably informed of accusations. There must be a variance between the information and the proof to be offered constituting such an imperfection or inaccuracy that the defendant was not fairly and reasonably informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him in order that a motion of dismissal be granted. People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968).
III. SPEEDY TRIAL
Judge Johnny C. Barajas ordered “SPEEDY TRIAL STARTS” exactly 161 days or 5 months 11 days after the ARRAIGNMENT of this case occuring, as documented on 01/31/14!!! WTF!!! Seriously?!?
NOTE: in re Speedy Trial pursuant C.R.S. 18-1-405 and pursuant to C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a)
Case Law: The right to a speedy trial is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions in essentially the same language (Valdez v. People, 174 Colo. 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971); Jaramillo v. Dist Ct, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971); People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P2d 15 (1972); Lucero v. People, 173 Colo. 94, 476 P2d 257 (1970)).
Case Law: Right of accused to speedy trial is an important right and when the constitutional mandate is invoked, the matter should receive careful consideration by the by the courts (Ex Parte Russo, 104 Colo. 91, 88 P2d 953 (1939)).
Case Law: The right to a speedy trial is not only for the benefit of the accused, but also for the protection of the public. It is essential that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished (Jaramillo, supra).
Case Law: It is duty of prosecutor and trial judge to secure and protect the defendant’s right to speedy trial (People v. Chavez, 779 P2d 375 (Colo. 1989); People v. Abeyta, Montoya & Santistevan, 195 Colo 338, 578 P2d 645 (05/08/1/78)).
C.R.S. & Rules: 18-1-105(6)(a) and Federal Court Rules Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G) establish time limits and exclusions.
TITLE 18. CRIMINAL CODE
ARTICLE 1.PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO OFFENSES GENERALLY
PART 4. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT
C.R.S. 18-1-405 (2014)
18-1-405. Speedy trial
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.
(2) If trial results in conviction which is reversed on appeal, any new trial must be commenced within six months after the date of the receipt by the trial court of the mandate from the appellate court.
(3) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.
(3.5) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date of the defendant’s next appearance.
(4) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is provided in subsection (1) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open court of record expressly agrees to the continuance or unless the defendant without making an appearance before the court in person or by his counsel files a dated written waiver of his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to this section and files an agreement to the continuance signed by the defendant. The time for trial, in the event of such agreement, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continuance and the date to which trial is continued.
(5) To be entitled to a dismissal under subsection (1) of this section, the defendant must move for dismissal prior to the commencement of his trial and prior to any pretrial motions which are set for hearing immediately before the trial or prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge or an included offense. Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s rights under this section.
(5.1) If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.
(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:
(a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after the issue of the defendant’s mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised;
(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution;
(c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance;
(d) The period of delay resulting from the voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; however, a defendant shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained, or he resists being returned to the state for trial;
(e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial;
(f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant;
(g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if:
(I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date; or
(II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification;
(h) The period of delay between the new date set for trial following the expiration of the time periods excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of this subsection (6), not to exceed three months;
(i) The period of delay between the filing of a motion pursuant to section 18-1-202 (11) and any decision by the court regarding such motion, and if such decision by the court transfers the case to another county, the period of delay until the first appearance of all the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred, and in such event the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall apply.
(7) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the case is subsequently transferred to a court in another county, the period within which trial must be had is extended for an additional three months from the date of the first appearance of all of the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred.
~Gonzo journo Billy bob Bramscher