Denver Colorado and the Adventures of Billy bob Bramscher – PART III

 T.S. LOVE

“All our dreams can come true, if we have the courage to pursue them.”  ~Walt Disney

“To be the man, you gotta beat the man!”  ~Ric Flair, The Nature Boy

STORYLINE:  This past week on October 8th, 2014 I was supposed to be the defendant in a Jury Trial for this UNCONSTITUTIONAL case YET because of Bystander Effect and/or Diffusion of Responsibility from Politicians, Denver Police Internal Affairs, Governor John Hickenlooper, Denver Mayor Michael Hancock, Denver City Attorney’s Office, Denver City and County District Attorney’s Office and so on I suffered a severe ANXIETY ATTACK and plummeted deep into DEPRESSION shocked and suicidal based on the actions of the Denver Police Department, Internal Affairs, the City Attorney’s Office and the sitting judge in this case.

Even though I did contact the Clerk of Court early the morning of the eighth, the visiting judge still issued a WARRANT in the amount of $250.00 plus a $50.00 WARRANT FEE so currently in the City & County of Denver, this Gonzo journalist is an OUTLAW!!!  Arrangements were made that I was going to appear Monday the 13th of 2014 YET I am scared and even though it will cost a great portion of the monies I have for this month I am going to satisfy this UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEBT prior to my appearance in court as I choose to spend no further time falsely imprisoned by false allegations and charges.  This motion will be submitted to the Municipal Court and to the District Court as well as all other parties mentioned…

P.S.  I have stated that I don’t know about YOU Cause I’m Feeling 22 at 42 yet just to share how TRUE these feelings are the following MOTION is 22 Pages!!!

MOTION TO QUASH A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

This Defendant, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, Pro Se, in the character or manner of a pauper (In forma pauperis) and also recognized by The Federal Government of The United States of America as DisABLED as well as a member in good standing of The Denver Press Club hereby beg of this Honorable Court humbly these following pleas requesting refuge from a Bad-Faith Investigation, Malicious & Vindictive Prosecution including Prosecutorial and Judicial Misconduct which has already pierced your hallowed halls with evil in re 14CV30627.

The Honorable Court is obligated by law to accept all the well-pleaded allegations of this MOTION as true (David v City and County of Denver, 101 F3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir 1996).  In Puckett v. Cox, it was held that a Pro se pleading requires less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA).  Justice Black in Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957) “The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” (according to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice).

Pursuant to C.M.C.R. 237 (2014) Rule 237(b) Appeals Colo. Crim. P. 37 (2014) Rule 37(a):

HISTORY

On 2/11/14, I, Billy bob Bramscher, did file the following MOTION(s) Pro Se resulting in the DISMISSAL:

MOTIONS FEB11 14GS000200

The following portion of the COURT TRANSCRIPT is what I refer to as SCREENPLAY DIALOGUE and PROVES as adjudicative FACT what truly transpired within this Kangaroo Court!!!

TRANSCRIPT

On, 2/12/2014 Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a “NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL:

City Attorney’s FEB12 Motion

On 2/21/14, I, Billy bob Bramscher, did file the following MOTION(s) Pro Se:

MOTIONS FEB20 14GS000200

On 04/25/14 Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CASE DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE:

City Attorney’s APR25 Motion

On 5/09/14, I, Billy bob Bramscher, did file the following MOTION(s) Pro Se:

MOTIONS MAY9 14GS000200

On 07/10/14 Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS MOOT with the District Court 14CV30627:

City Attorney’s JULY10 Motion

Also on this UNCONSTITUTIONAL date in history, Johnny C. Barajas ordered “SPEEDY TRIAL STARTS” exactly 161 days or 5 months 11 days after the ARRAIGNMENT of this case occuring, as documented on 01/31/14!!!  WTF!!!  Seriously?!?

***CASE & CONTROVERSY***

I.  Case 14GS000200 was DISMISSED according to LAW 

The ADJUDICATED FACT of this matter is that this case was DISMISSED w/o PREJUDICE by this court on 2/11/14.  The Denver City’s Attorney’s Office and its AGENTS however, with childish “Choose Your Own Adventure” reasoning, NEGLECTED to file the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CASE DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE within the TIME FRAME allowable under STATE and FEDERAL LAW!!!  In the STATE OF COLORADO for any MOTION for RECONSIDERATION the DEFENDANT or the PROSECUTION has ONLY 35 DAYS and Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 KNOWINGLY filed their EVIL motion 74 DAYS or 2 MONTHS and 15 DAYS after Judge Johnny C. Barajas RULED!!!

One would not only consider, I believe, YET require Drinking and Driving Judge Johnny to HONORABLY disregard Vinny and Meg’s MOOT motion YET as previously recorded Johnny reinstated this case on 5/20/2014 MOTION GRANTED – CASE REINSTATED – ALESSI CASE CITED IS DISPOSITIVE.  JCM/ERM.

Really…  REALLY?!?   Alessi v. Municipal Court in and for Canon City (1976)!!!  WTF…  Canon City is PRISON CITY, U.S.A.  ROFLMBO!!!  I agree that Marbury v. Madison established Judiciary Review YET this is absolutely ABSURD.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse for the common-man YET for the Agent’s with the Denver City Attorney’s Office as well as the sitting JUDGE this behavior is CLEARLY SHOCKING and UNCONSTITUTIONAL and ESTABLISHES this CONSPIRACY!!!

COLORADO MUNICIPAL COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 30 COLORADO MUNICIPAL COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE
C.M.C.R. 237 (2014)

Rule 237. Appeals.

(b)

Appeals From Courts of Record. Appeals from courts of record shall be in accordance with Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure.

COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 29 COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ALL COURTS OF RECORD IN COLORADO
VII. JUDGMENT
Colo. Crim. P. 37 (2014)

Rule 37. Appeals from County Court.

(a)

Filing Notice of Appeal and Docketing Appeal. The district attorney may appeal a question of law, and the defendant may appeal a judgment of the county court in a criminal action under simplified procedure to the district court of the county. To appeal the appellant shall, within 35 days after the date of entry of the judgment or the denial of posttrial motions, whichever is later, file notice of appeal in the county court, post such advance costs as may be required for the preparation of the record and serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon the appellee. He shall also, within such 35 days, docket the appeal in the district court and pay the docket fee. No motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment shall be required as a prerequisite to an appeal, but such motions if filed shall be pursuant to Rule 33(b) of these Rules.

II.  This COURT fatally failed to acquire JURISDICTION

Sufficiency of information is matter of jurisdiction. People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975).

COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 29 COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ALL COURTS OF RECORD IN COLORADO
III. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Colo. Crim. P. 7 (2014)

The Information. 

(1) An information shall be a written statement, signed by the prosecutor and filed in the court having jurisdiction over the offense charged, alleging that a person committed the criminal offense described therein.

(2) Requisites of the Information. The information shall be deemed technically sufficient and correct if it can be understood therefrom:

(I) That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense;

(II) That the defendant is identified therein, either by name or by the defendant’s patterned chemical structure of genetic information, or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant;

(III) That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is triable therein;

(IV) That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction.

But if information fails to charge crime, court acquires no jurisdiction. People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)

Verification of an information is required under this rule. Scott v. People, 176 Colo. 289, 490 P.2d 1295 (1971).

Rather, information is sufficient if it advises a defendant of the offense with which he is charged. Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).

And can be understood by the jury. An information is sufficient if the charge is in language from which the nature of the offense may be readily understood by the accused and jury. Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226, 176 P. 280 (1918); Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924); Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932); Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943); Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P.2d 447 (1947); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972).

So that defendant can defend against it. An information is sufficient if it advises the accused of the charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend against it. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968); Perez v. People, 176 Colo. 505, 491 P.2d 969 (1971); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981).

And be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the charges he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973). People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003).

Dismissal if defendant not fairly and reasonably informed of accusations. There must be a variance between the information and the proof to be offered constituting such an imperfection or inaccuracy that the defendant was not fairly and reasonably informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him in order that a motion of dismissal be granted. People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968).

MOTIONS FEB11 14GS000200

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The Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, proceeding Pro Se files the foregoing motions with the Honorable Court and the Office of the District Attorney. The Defense submits the following motions totaling six (6) pages on 02/10/2014 with Disposition set for February 11, 2014 at 8:30 AM in Courtroom 3H. Per CRS 16-9-501 (2013) a copy of this motion/pleading has been filed with the office of John. W. Suthers Attorney General of the Colorado Department of Law.  The Defendant is falsely and malicious charged with the following offenses in re Denver Municipal Code:

Sec. 38-91. Disturbance by use of telephone.

It shall be unlawful for any person by means or use of the telephone to disturb, or tend to disturb, the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any other person or family by repeated and continued anonymous or identified telephone messages intended to harass or disturb such other person or family to whom such message is directed; or by a single telephone call or repeated telephone calls to use obscene, profane, indecent or offensive language, or suggest any lewd or lascivious act over or through a telephone in the city; or to attempt to extort money or other thing of value from any other person or family by means of use of the telephone; or to threaten any physical violence or harm to any other person or family by means or use of the telephone; or repeatedly and continuously to ring the telephone of any other person or family with intent to disturb such person or family, provided, however, that the normal use of the telephone for the purpose of requesting payment of debts or obligations or for other legitimate business purposes shall not constitute a violation hereof.

Sec. 38-92. Threats.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to make, convey or cause to be imparted or conveyed, in any manner or by any means, to any other person, any threat concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, toinjure or to kill any person, or to damage or to destroy any property.

 MOTION ONE (1)

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DENVER COUNTY

COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS

I, William Robert Bramscher, in this case declare that I am unable to pay the costs of these

proceedings and that I am entitled to the relief requested to include yet not be limited to

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court costs and jury costs. The Defense requests the maximum number of jury members

possible for the trial by jury which is hereby requested as guaranteed.

 MOTION TWO (2)

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

Per CRCP 16 (2013)

The Colorado Constitution mandates that a defendant be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation (Highly v People, 65 Colo 497, 177 P975 (1918) Colo Lexis 419; United States v Whiffen, 121 F3d 18, 08/29/1997; United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir 1993)).

Telephone “Harassment/Disturbance” by Use of Telephone requires proof of a telephone or computer communication that is obscene or is made in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage (People v Carey, 198 P3d 1223 (01/17/08)).

MOTION THREE (3)

BILL OF PARTICULARS

The court may direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for a bill of particulars may be made only within 14 days after arraignment or at such other time before or after arraignment as may be prescribed by rule or order. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires.  Purpose of a bill of particulars is to define more specifically offense charged (Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1965)).A bill of particulars calls for an exposition of the facts that the prosecution intends to prove and limits the proof at trial to those areas described in the bill (People v. District Court, 198 Colo. 501, 603 P.2d 127 (1979)).

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to enable the defendant to properly prepare his defense in cases where the indictment, although sufficient to advise the defendant of the charges raised against him, is nonetheless so indefinite in its statement of a particular charge that it does not afford the defendant a fair opportunity to procure witnesses and prepare for trial (People v. District Court, 198 Colo. 501, 603 P.2d 127 (1979)).

A bill of particulars must provide such information requested by defendant as is necessary for the defendant to prepare his defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise. However, a defendant is not necessarily entitled to receive all the information requested for a bill of need not disclose in

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detail all evidence upon which it intends to rely (People v. Lewis, 671 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1983)).Bill mandatory where crime charged in words of statute. Where the crime of theft is charged in the words of the statute, an order for a bill of particulars is mandatory upon the defendant’s request (People v. District Court, 198 Colo. 501, 603 P.2d 127 (1979)).

MOTION FOUR (4)

38-91 DISTURBANCE BY USE OF TELEPHONE IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

 Citing People v Weeks, 591 P2d 91 (1979), “Although each case ultimately must defend on its own specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A state or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content (see Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 97 (1949); Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 356, 554, 13 L Ed 2d 471, 85 S Ct 453 (1965); Adderly v Florida, 385 US 39, 17 L Ed 2d 149, 87 S Ct 242 (1966)). But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First {591 P2d 96} Amendment strictly limits its powers” (see Police Dept of Chicago v Mosely, 408 US 92, 33 L Ed 2d 212, 92 S Ct 2286 (1972); Fowler v Rhode Island, 345 US 67, 97 L Ed 828, 73 S Ct526 (1953); Kovacs v Cooper, supra at 97 (Jackson, J. concurring).

Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home (see Rowan v Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970)), or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure…As Mr. Justice Harlan cautioned: “The ability of government, consonant with the constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is…dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silent dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.” (see Cohen v California, 403 US, at 21, 29 L Ed 2d 284, 91 S Ct 1780 (1971); Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 209-210, 95 S Ct 2268, 45 L Ed 2d 125 (1975)).  Citing FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 57 L Ed 2d 1073, 98 S Ct 3026 (1978), “The fact that society may find speech offensive is not sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. {485 US 56} For it is a central tenet of the First

Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the market place of ideas” and citing Street v New York, supra, “It is firmly settled that…the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”

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A fatal error to the charge 38-91 is that the alleged conduct was received at a business as reported and 38-91 and C.R.S. 18-9-111(1)(e) protects, as defined by case law, the substantial privacy interests of the “home”.  A fundamental cannon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning (see Perrin v United States, 444 US 37, 62 L Ed 2d 199, 100 S Ct 311 (1979)). Statute 38-91 protects the “privacy” of “any other person or family”.  A vague law offends due process because it fails to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited and does not supply adequate standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement (People v Janousek, 871 P2d 1195 (Colo 1994); see also Board of Education v Cincinnati, 402 US 611, 614, 29 L Ed 214, 91 S Ct 1686 (1971)).  The term “DISTURBANCE” is synonymous with “harassment”, “upset” or “annoy”. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it includes within its proscriptions a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech (see New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 769, 73 L Ed2d 1113, 102 S Ct 3348 (1982); People v Baer, 973 P2d 1225, 1231, 01/25/99; Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 613, 37 L Ed 2d 830, 93 S Ct 3908 (1973); People v Ryan, 806 P2d 935, 940 (Colo 1991)).  Many states have harassment statutes containing language similar to that contained in Colorado’s statute 18-9-111(1)(e) and Denver Municipal Code 38-91. However, the vast majority of these statutes either do not punish repeated communications merely because they are “offensively course”. Several statutes, for example, apply only to harassment by telephone or other means which invade the privacy of person’s within their homes. (People v Smith, 862 P2d 939, 11/15/93).

MOTION FIVE (5)

39-92(A) THREAT TO INJURE A PERSON OR DAMAGE PROPERTY IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

 A statute, such as 38-92(a) which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind; what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech (see Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 22 L Ed 2d 664, 89 S Ct 1399, 01/21/1969).Defendant petitions that the term “THREAT” as applied to 10CR3690 and William Robert Bramscher is unconstitutional, vague and overbroad in violation of substantive/procedural Due Process and Equal Protection.

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While some threats have no First Amendment protections, other threats are protected speech. In Aguilar v People, the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that “Constitutionally protected speech may be threatening” (886 P2d 725, 728 (Colo 1994). Citing People v Janousek, 871 P2d 1189 04/04/84, “The critical inquiry for First Amendment purposes is whether the statements, viewed in the context in which they were spoken or written, constitute a “True Threat” (see also Watts, 394 US at 708; United States v Welch, 745 F2d614, 618 (10th Cir 1984) cert denied, 470 US 1006, 84 L Ed 2d 384, 105 S Ct 1364 (1985); United States v Dysart, 705 P2d1247, 1256 (10th Cir, cert denied 464 US 934, 78 L Ed 2d 307, 104 S Ct 339 (1983) in re a “True threat is a serious threat, as opposed to mere political argument, talk, or jest”.  The defendant argues that a “True threat” never existed and that constitutionally protected speech was manipulated to chill defendants, Billy bob Bramscher’s, criticisms of in the forms of Freedom of Speech, Press and the right to petition for redress of grievances and that William Robert Bramscher is a victim of First Amendment Retaliation.

 MOTION SIX (6)

 MOTION FOR EXTENDED TIME TO FILE MOTIONS

 The defense hereby requests an additional ten (10) days to file/amend motions with this court to elapse after the Disposition Hearing scheduled 02/11/02014.Pro Se Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, hereby certifies that an exact and true copy of the document was delivered in person to the following:

1) Office of the Attorney General

Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center

1300 Broadway, 10th Floor

Denver, CO 80203

2) Denver District Attorney

Second Judicial District

201 W. Colfax Avenue

Denver, Colorado 80202

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William Robert Bramscher 02/10/2014

____________________ __________

County of

On this, the________day of __________, 20____, before me a notary public, the

undersigned officer, personally appeared________________, known to me (or satisfactorily

proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and

acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.

In witness hereof, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.

___________________________

MOTIONS FEB20 14GS000200

DATE: 02/21/2014 (Page ONE of ONE)

PRO SE DEFENDANT: William R. Bramscher, 9181 E. Star Hill Pt., Lone Tree, CO 80124

On 02/11/14 this court did DISMISS W/O PREJUDICE BY COURT this case with a decision manipulated by the purposeful perjury of City Attorney Megan Jones (ID:P04105).  Prior to allowing Megan Jones the opportunity to procure the necessary Probable Cause determination by contacting Detective Daniel Diaz-Deleon with the Denver Police JUDGE: JCB repeatedly stated that if the proper Probable Cause was not received that JUDGE: JCB would

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE.

City Attorney Megan Jones explained to the court that “the officer” works evenings until three o’clock in the morning and that he was unavailable via phone/text which is a purposeful fabrication whereas the “officer” in question is DETECTIVE Daniel Diaz-Deleon who works 8:00am – 5:00pm Monday through Friday and would have been easily available to submit to the demands of Megan Jones if PROBABLE CAUSE existed.

Based on the above, it is the Pro Se Defendant’s belief that his Procedural and Substantive Rights to Due Process and the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated whereas Deleon, under color-of-state, perpetrated a malicious action against Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, lacking probable cause resulting in a vindictive prosecution perpetrated by Megan Jones, under color-of-state, in violation of The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct:

1) Rule 3.8(a) “refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is notsupported by probable cause” and;

2) Rule 3.4(d) “in pretrial procedure…fail to make reasonable diligent effort to comply witha legally proper discovery request [Probable Cause] by an opposing party.”

The Pro Se Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, petitions this court to ORDER Case Number

14GS000200 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on the facts (truth) above. The bad-faith investigation, malicious charges and vindictive prosecution are without merit and Detective Daniel Diaz-Deleon, City Attorney Megan Jones and so on should be forbidden from filing another lawsuit based on the same grounds.

The Pro Se Defendant also requests for this court to confirm that there DOES NOT exist ACTIVE WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER’s issued in this case. The Action Information reflects at 02/11/14 08:10 MOTION GRANTED. The Pro Se Defendant insists his innocence and any orders per this court in re 14GS000200 would procedurally and substantially negatively affect/effect Civil Remedies which William Robert Bramscher is seeking.

MOTIONS MAY9 14GS000200

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The Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, proceeding Pro Se files the foregoing motions with the Honorable Court.  The Defendant has requested a copy of the discovery as of the last court date and this information has NOT yet been given to the defendant. The defendant, however, is aware that there is no “audio” which is required by case precedent in re the “telephone harassment” charge and all other charges stemming from the false allegations. Lacking proof of Disturbance by use of telephone there in NO probable cause and this case must be dismissed with prejudice!  The Defense submits the following motion(s) in response to the Prosecutions appeal.  The Defendant is falsely and malicious charged with the following offenses in re Denver

Municipal Code:

Sec. 38-91. Disturbance by use of telephone.

It shall be unlawful for any person by means or use of the telephone to disturb, or tend to disturb, the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any other person or family by repeated and continued anonymous or identified telephone messages intended to harass or disturb such other person or family to whom such message is directed; or by a single telephone call or repeated telephone calls to use obscene, profane, indecent or offensive language, or suggest any lewd or lascivious act over or through a telephone in the city; or to attempt to extort money or other thing of value from any other person or family by means of use of the telephone; or to threaten any physical violence or harm to any other person or family by means or use of the telephone; or repeatedly and continuously to ring the telephone of any other person or family with intent to disturb such person or family, provided, however, that the normal use of the telephone for the purpose of requesting payment of debts or obligations or for other legitimate business purposes shall not constitute a violation hereof.

Sec. 38-92. Threats.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to make, convey or cause to be imparted or conveyed, in any manner or by any means, to any other person, any threat concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to injure or to kill any person, or to damage or to destroy any property.

MOTION TWO (1)

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

Per CRCP 16 (2013)

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The Colorado Constitution mandates that a defendant be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation (Highly v People, 65 Colo 497, 177 P975 (1918) Colo Lexis 419; United States v Whiffen, 121 F3d 18, 08/29/1997; United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir 1993)).

Telephone “Harassment/Disturbance” by Use of Telephone requires proof of a telephone or computer communication that is obscene or is made in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage (People v Carey, 198 P3d 1223 (01/17/08)).

MOTION FOUR (2)

38-91 DISTURBANCE BY USE OF TELEPHONE IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

Citing People v Weeks, 591 P2d 91 (1979), “Although each case ultimately must defend on its own specific facts, some general principles have emerged. A state or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content (see Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 97 (1949); Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 356, 554, 13 L Ed 2d 471, 85 S Ct 453 (1965); Adderly v Florida, 385 US 39, 17 L Ed 2d 149, 87 S Ct 242 (1966)). But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First {591 P2d 96} Amendment strictly limits its powers (see Police Dept of Chicago v Mosely, 408 US 92, 33 L Ed 2d 212, 92 S Ct 2286 (1972); Fowler v Rhode Island, 345 US 67, 97 L Ed 828, 73 S Ct526 (1953); Kovacs v Cooper, supra at 97 (Jackson, J. concurring).  Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home (see Rowan v Post Office Dept, 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970)), or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure…As Mr Justice Harlan cautioned: “The ability of government, consonant with the constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is…dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silent dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.” (see Cohen v California, 403 US, at 21, 29 L Ed 2d 284, 91 S Ct 1780 (1971); Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 209-210, 95 S Ct 2268, 45 L Ed 2d 125 (1975)).Citing FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 57 L Ed 2d 1073, 98 S Ct 3026 (1978), “The fact that society may find speech offensive is not sufficient reason for suppressing it.  Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. {485 US 56} For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the market place of ideas” and citing Street v New York, supra, “It is firmly settled that…the public expression of ideas may

3

not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”  A fatal error to the charge 38-91 is that the alleged conduct was received at a business as reported and 38-91 and C.R.S. 18-9-111(1)(e) protects, as defined by case law, the substantial privacy interests of the “home”.A fundamental cannon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning (see Perrin v United States, 444 US 37, 62 L Ed 2d 199, 100 S Ct 311 (1979)). Statute 38-91 protects the “privacy” of “any other person or family”.  A vague law offends due process because it fails to give fair notice of the conduct prohibited and does not supply adequate standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement (People v Janousek, 871 P2d 1195 (Colo 1994); see also Board of Education v Cincinnati, 402 US 611, 614, 29 L Ed 214, 91 S Ct 1686 (1971)).

The term “DISTURBANCE” is synonymous with “harassment”, “upset” or “annoy”.  A statute is unconstitutionally over-broad if it includes within its proscriptions a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech (see New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 769, 73 L Ed2d 1113, 102 S Ct 3348 (1982); People v Baer, 973 P2d 1225, 1231, 01/25/99; Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 613, 37 L Ed 2d 830, 93 S Ct 3908 (1973); People v Ryan, 806 P2d 935, 940 (Colo 1991)).

Many states have harassment statutes containing language similar to that contained in Colorado’s statute 18-9-111(1)(e) and Denver Municipal Code 38-91. However, the vast majority of these statutes either do not punish repeated communications merely because they are “offensively course”. Several statutes, for example, apply only to harassment by telephone or other means which invade the privacy of person’s within their homes. (People v Smith, 862 P2d 939, 11/15/93).

MOTION FIVE (3)

39-92(A) THREAT TO INJURE A PERSON OR DAMAGE PROPERTY IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

A statute, such as 38-92(a) which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind; what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech (see Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 22 L Ed 2d 664, 89 S Ct 1399, 01/21/1969).

4

Defendant petitions that the term “THREAT” as applied to 10CR3690 and William Robert Bramscher is unconstitutional, vague and overbroad in violation of substantive/procedural Due Process and Equal Protection.  While some threats have no First Amendment protections, other threats are protected speech. In Aguilar v People, the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that “Constitutionally protected speech may be threatening” (886 P2d 725, 728 (Colo 1994). Citing People v Janousek, 871 P2d 1189 04/04/84, “The critical inquiry for First Amendment purposes is whether the statements, viewed in the context in which they were spoken or written, constitute a “True Threat” (see also Watts, 394 US at 708; United States v Welch, 745 F2d 614, 618 (10th Cir 1984) cert denied, 470 US 1006, 84 L Ed 2d 384, 105 S Ct 1364 (1985); United States v Dysart, 705 P2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir, cert denied 464 US 934, 78 L Ed 2d 307, 104 S Ct 339 (1983) in re a “True threat is a serious threat, as opposed to mere political argument, talk, or jest”.The defendant argues that a “True threat” never existed and that constitutionally protected speech was manipulated to chill defendants, Billy bob Bramscher’s, criticisms of in the forms of Freedom of Speech, Press and the right to petition for redress of grievances and that William Robert Bramscher is a victim of First Amendment Retaliation.

MOTION SIX (4)

MOTION FOR EXTENDED TIME TO FILE MOTIONS

The defense hereby requests an additional ten (10) days to file/amend motions with this court to elapse starting today to allow additional time to acquire discovery.

III.  SPEEDY TRIAL

Judge Johnny C. Barajas ordered “SPEEDY TRIAL STARTS” exactly 161 days or 5 months 11 days after the ARRAIGNMENT of this case occurring, as documented on 1/31/14 01/31/14!!!

NOTE:  in re Speedy Trial pursuant C.R.S. 18-1-405 and pursuant to C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a)

Case Law:  The right to a speedy trial is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions in essentially the same language (Valdez v People, 174 Colo 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971); Jaramillo v Dist Ct, 174 Colo 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971); People v Small, 177 Colo 118, 493 P2d 15 (1972); Lucero v People, 173 Colo 94, 476 P2d 257 (1970)).

Case Law:  Right of accused to speedy trial is an important right and when the constitutional mandate is invoked, the matter should receive careful consideration by the by the courts (Ex Parte Russo, 104 Colo 91, 88 P2d 953 (1939)).

Case Law:  The right to a speedy trial is not only for the benefit of the accused, but also for the protection of the public.  It is essential that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished (Jaramillo, supra).

Case Law:  It is duty of prosecutor and trial judge to secure and protect the defendant’s right to speedy trial (People v Chavez, 779 P2d 375 (Colo 1989); People v Abeyta, Montoya & Santistevan, 195 Colo 338, 578 P2d 645 (05/08/1/78)).

C.R.S. & Rules:  18-1-105(6)(a) and Federal Court Rules Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G) establish time limits and exclusions.

TITLE 18. CRIMINAL CODE
ARTICLE 1.PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO OFFENSES GENERALLY
PART 4. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT
C.R.S. 18-1-405 (2014)

18-1-405. Speedy trial

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.

(2) If trial results in conviction which is reversed on appeal, any new trial must be commenced within six months after the date of the receipt by the trial court of the mandate from the appellate court.

(3) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.

(3.5) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date of the defendant’s next appearance.

(4) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is provided in subsection (1) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open court of record expressly agrees to the continuance or unless the defendant without making an appearance before the court in person or by his counsel files a dated written waiver of his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to this section and files an agreement to the continuance signed by the defendant. The time for trial, in the event of such agreement, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continuance and the date to which trial is continued.

(5) To be entitled to a dismissal under subsection (1) of this section, the defendant must move for dismissal prior to the commencement of his trial and prior to any pretrial motions which are set for hearing immediately before the trial or prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge or an included offense. Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s rights under this section.

(5.1) If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.

(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:

(a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after the issue of the defendant’s mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised;

(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution;

(c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance;

(d) The period of delay resulting from the voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; however, a defendant shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained, or he resists being returned to the state for trial;

(e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial;

(f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant;

(g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if:

(I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date; or

(II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification;

(h) The period of delay between the new date set for trial following the expiration of the time periods excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of this subsection (6), not to exceed three months;

(i) The period of delay between the filing of a motion pursuant to section 18-1-202 (11) and any decision by the court regarding such motion, and if such decision by the court transfers the case to another county, the period of delay until the first appearance of all the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred, and in such event the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall apply.

(7) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the case is subsequently transferred to a court in another county, the period within which trial must be had is extended for an additional three months from the date of the first appearance of all of the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred.

Citing People v Westendorf, 37 Colo App 111, 11/13/75, “An insufficient indictment does not legally charge a crime or subject defendant to the jurisdiction of the court” and an Information is sufficiently particular if it elucidates the elements of a crime, enlightens a defendant as to the nature of the charges against which he must defend and enables him to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense (seeUnited States v Whiffen, 121 F3d 18, 08/29/97; see also United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir 1993).

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation, generally, is rooted in the United States Constitutions Sixth Amendment.  The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is substantial and cannot be denied (quoting Grimsley v United States (1931, CA5 FLA) 50 F2d 509) and the information must answer the questions of who, what, where, and how (quoting People v Joseph, 920 P2d 850 (Colo APP 1995); see also People v Tucker, 631 P2d 162 (07/13/81); People v Steiner, 640 P2d 250, 05/20/81)).  A defendant charged with a crime must be brought into court on a complaint, information, or indictment made or found according to the requirements of the law (quotingBustamante v People, 136 Colo 362, 317 P2d 885 (1957)) and there can be no conviction or punishment for a crime without formal and sufficient accusation (quoting Spence v Dowd (194, CA7 IND) 145 F2d 451).

Fatal Errors in the Complaint & Information case 10CR3690 include, yet are not limited to:  (1) Failure to specify date & time of the commission of offense (see People v Timmes, 643 P2d 780 (Colo APP 1981); (2) Failure to allege essential elements of crime (see Magee v People, 79 Colo 328, 245 P708 (1926); (3) Failure to allege offense with specificity (see People v Westendorf, 37 Colo APP 111, 542 P2d 1300 (1975); and (4) There are numerous ways to commt the crime of C.R.S. 18-8-615 and the information did not state manner in which it was allegedly committed (see People vTucker, 631 P2d 162, (07/13/81); Reimer-Gross Co v United States (1927, CA6 OHIO) 20 F2d 36 ; State v Prejean (1950) 216 LA 1072, 45 So 2d 627).

WHEREFORE, this Defendant, Pro se, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher requests that the Court QUASH this CRIMINAL PROCEEDING confirming the LEGAL and TIMELY dismissal of this case 14GS000200/14CV30627 preserving TRUTH, JUSTICE and the AMERICAN WAY!!!

PLEASE NOTE:  I shall be in attendance on 10/13/14 in courtroom 3H infront of visiting judge whom I believed based on limit facts would have allowed this UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRIAL to continue.  I was supposed to have had TRIAL on 10/12/2014 yet I was suffering from a severe anxiety attack compounded with depression and I had to call into the clerk of court to cancel this TRIAL DATE as I was terrified.  As of now, there is a $250 bond for my arrest as issued by the visiting judge and I shall be reporting as arranged with said clerk of court in the morning at 8:30am.  Please and with care exonerate me from these false charges and Civil Rights violations with God Speed.  Amen.

3:39pm M/S/T

10/12/2014

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher

~BbB~

Pro Se Defendant, William Robert Bramscher, hereby certifies that an exact and true copy of the document was delivered in person to the following:

1) Office of the Attorney General

Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center

1300 Broadway, 10th Floor

Denver, CO 80203

2) Denver City Attorney

1437 Bannock St. #353

Denver, Colorado 80202

3) Denver District Court

1437 Bannock St.

Denver, Colorado 80202

4)  The Attorney Regulation Counsel, and (5) Commission on Judicial Performance

~end~

~Aloha…

~Gonzo journo Billy bob Bramscher

~BbB~

FACEBOOK:  https://www.facebook.com/BlueDakini

The Denver Press Club

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One thought on “Denver Colorado and the Adventures of Billy bob Bramscher – PART III

  1. Pingback: Jeff Sessions Benedict Arnold!!! | Lonesome Lozer

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