Due Prosecution, Substantive Defect, Speedy Trial, Federal Jurisdiction, Double Jeopardy

Denver Seal

“Well for one, the 13th amendment to the constitution of the US which abolished slavery – did not abolish slavery for those convicted of a crime.”
~Angela Davis

“And a democracy can’t exist without free speech and the right to assemble.  And that’s what Americans tend to forget. And they’re born into a culture where they take all of their freedoms for granted.”

~Larry Claxton Flynt, Jr.


STORYLINE:  Monday February 9th, 2015, I am scheduled for a Jury Trial on a criminal case that was dismissed February 11th, 2014.

Friday, 02/07/15 the following motions (petitions, grievances, pleas, prayers) to the Supreme Court of Colorado, the City Attorney’s and the City and County of Denver court 3H.

If justice does exist this case will NOT be going to jury trial and I shall be proven innocent based on the adjudicated facts presented abiding by rule, law and statute.

I am prepared to go to trial!!!  Totally cereal…  eYe PROMISE this TRUTH shall PREVAIL!!!


The City and County of Denver

v.

BRAMSCHER, William R

Municipal Case Number:  14GS000200

District Court Case Number:  2014CV030627

Colorado Supreme Court Case Number:  2014SA318


***Motion to Dismiss for Want of Due Prosecution Part I***

~amended 02.08.15~

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

Procedural due process

IV.  ARGUMENT

A.  Substantive Due Process

B.  Case or Controversy

V.  CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

People v. Williams, 961 P2d 533 (Colo. App. 1997)

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)

People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo. 1981)

People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93, 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978)

People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37, 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975)

People v. Fueston I, 717 P.2d at 982-82 (Colo. App. 1985)

People v. Westendorf, 37Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975)

Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. 1986)

People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 106, 575 P.2d 427, 429 (1978)

People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269, 270 (Colo. 1983)

People v. Hunter, 666 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1983)

People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 496, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971)

Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 413, 444 F.2d 267, 269 (1968)

United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (188[1])

People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975)

People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)

Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971)

People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973)

People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973)

People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973)

Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924)

Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932)

Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943)

Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 F.2d 447 (1947)

Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961)

Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972)

Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972)

Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968)

Perez v. People, 176 Colo. 505, 491 P.2d 969 (1971)

Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972)

People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981)

People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944)

Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961)

People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968)

People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003)

Other Authorities

Fourth Amendment, USC

Crim. P. 203(a)

Crim. P. 204(b)(4)

Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure 2.10, at 114 (1996)

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)

Fifth Amendment, USC

Fourteenth Amendment, USC

Colo. Crim. P. 7 (2014)

Crim. P. 7(b)(1)

Section 16-5-202(1), C.R.S. (2013)

Crim. P. 7(b)(2)

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)

Case or Controversy

 I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

The false allegations in this case are were that on December 23, 2013, Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher was terminated by his employer and that after leaving the building, Bramscher repeatedly called River Rock Dispensary harassing the employees by using foul language and threatening them.  The General Sessions Summons and Complaint was issued and signed by Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 who is currently on paid leave as reported by The Denver Channel.

On February 11th, 2014, Judge Johnny C. Barajas DISMISSED 14GS000200 ruling, “Okay, well it does say it has to be a brief description, so that suggests to me that there has to be more than just the boxes being checked off.  So I am going to go ahead and dismiss it without prejudice” (pg. 14, 5-9) TRANSCRIPT.

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant Bramscher was charged with violating the Denver Revised Municipal Code, Section 38-91 (Disturbance by Use of Telephone) and 38-92(a) (Threats).  The Complaint 14GS000200 is defective in form and fatally fails to invoke the jurisdiction of this court absent the required “probable cause” statement and “victim’s full name” as required in the Fourth AmendmentSee also Crim. P. 203(a); Crim. P. 204(b)(4).

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

Citing People v. Williams, 961 P2d 533 (Colo. App. 1997), “A substantive defect in an information may be raised at any time during the proceedings.”

Colorado has followed the modern trend of testing the sufficiency of the information based upon the fundamental objectives the information serves rather than technical pleading requirements of the common law. See Robert J. Dieter, Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure 2.10, at 114 (1996). This functional approach mirrors the efforts of the federal criminal code and follows the lead of the Supreme Court. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (noting that a charging document is sufficient if it, “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (liberalizing the technical common law pleading requirements).

We are aware that, in some cases, lack of specificity has been held to constitute a fatal defect in the charging document. But we view those cases as distinguishable because, in each case, the defect would have precluded the preparation of a meaningful defense. See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo. 1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93, 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37, 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it “failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the defendant’s statements so as to enable him to prepare his defense”); People v. Fueston I, 717 P.2d at 982-82 (Colo. App. 1985) (information was fatally defective because it “failed to allege which of the many statements contained in the defendant’s 1982 liquor license renewal application were false”); People v. Westendorf, 37Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975) (indictment was fatally defective because it “contains no statements which are alleged to have been perjurious”).

IV.  ARGUMENT

Sufficiency of information is matter of jurisdiction. See People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975).

Quoting Cornell University Law School, “The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be ‘deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’ The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states. These words have as their central promise an assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law (‘legality’) and provide fair procedures. Most of this essay concerns that promise. We should briefly note, however, three other uses these words have had in American constitutional law.”

COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  
CHAPTER 29 COLORADO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR ALL COURTS OF RECORD IN COLORADO  
III. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
Colo. Crim. P. 7 (2014)

The Information.

(1) An information shall be a written statement, signed by the prosecutor and filed in the court having jurisdiction over the offense charged, alleging that a person committed the criminal offense described therein.

(2) Requisites of the Information. The information shall be deemed technically sufficient and correct if it can be understood therefrom:

(I) That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense;

(II) That the defendant is identified therein, either by name or by the defendant’s patterned chemical structure of genetic information, or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant;

(III) That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is triable therein;

(IV) That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction.

But if information fails to charge crime, court acquires no jurisdiction. People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)

Verification of an information is required under this rule. Scott v. People, 176 Colo. 289, 490 P.2d 1295 (1971).

Rather, information is sufficient if it advises a defendant of the offense with which he is charged. Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).

And can be understood by the jury. An information is sufficient if the charge is in language from which the nature of the offense may be readily understood by the accused and jury. Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226, 176 P. 280 (1918); Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924); Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932); Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943); Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 F.2d 447 (1947); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972).

So that defendant can defend against it. An information is sufficient if it advises the accused of the charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend against it. Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 444 P.2d 267 (1968); Perez v. People, 176 Colo. 505, 491 P.2d 969 (1971); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981).

And be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. An information is sufficient if it advises the defendant of the charges he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be protected from further prosecution for the same offense. People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972); People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973). People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973); People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980); People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003).

Dismissal if defendant not fairly and reasonably informed of accusations. There must be a variance between the information and the proof to be offered constituting such an imperfection or inaccuracy that the defendant was not fairly and reasonably informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him in order that a motion of dismissal be granted. People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968).

Substantive due process  

An information is a “written statement, signed by the prosecutor and filed in the court having jurisdiction over the offense charged, alleging that a person committed the criminal offense described therein.” Crim. P. 7(b)(1). Section 16-5-202(1), C.R.S. (2013), sets forth the requisites of an information:

The information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom:

That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense;

That the defendant is named therein or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant;

That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court or is triable therein;

That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction.

Rule 7(b)(2) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure mirrors section 16-5-202(1). When an information satisfies each of these requirements, it invokes jurisdiction of the court. An information serves two vital interests of a constitutional dimension: (1) it provides the defendant with notice of the offense charged, as well as the factual circumstances surrounding the offense so that the defendant can adequately defend him or herself; and (2) it protects the defendant from further prosecution for the same offense. See Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. 1986)People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 106, 575 P.2d 427, 429 (1978).

An information that fails to charge an essential element of an offense is substantively defectiveSee Cervantes, 715 P.2d at 786; People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269, 270 (Colo. 1983). This essential element requirement is satisfied if the language in the charge tracks the statutory language. See People v. Hunter, 666 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1983)People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 496, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971); Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 413, 444 F.2d 267, 269 (1968). “It is generally sufficient that the indictment [or information] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.'” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (188[1])).

Case or Controversy

Among the essential elements of what the Court considers a case or controversy is an injured plaintiff.  The requirement that a plaintiff show that he or she has suffered “injury in fact” is a key requirement of the Court’s doctrine of standing.  (Note:  Standing is necessary to establish jurisdiction)

The standing doctrine consists of both constitutionally-derived rules and judicially-created gatekeeping (“prudential”) rules.  The Court has found Article III to require that plaintiffs demonstrate injury-in-fact, that the injury in question is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action, and that the injury is one that could be redressed by a favorable decision.

V.  CONCLUSION

It is an adjudicated fact that the charges fail to identify the particular statement(s) or assertion(s) alleged to be harassing or threatening also failing to identify any alleged victims. See Fueston, 717 P.2d 978 (Fueston I) (to charge the crime of offering a false instrument for recording, the information must identify the statements alleged to be false), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 749 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1988) (Fueston II); cf. Westendorf, 37 Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975) (perjury indictment must identify the statements alleged to be false).  If complaint fails to charge crime, court acquires no jurisdiction. See People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).

The Summons and Complaint FATALLY fails to comply with Fourth Amendment, USC and this court has no jurisdiction of this case and/or defendant.

Crim. P. 203(a), Crim. P. 204(b)(4), Fifth AmendmentFourteenth Amendment, Crim. P. 7(b)(1), Section 16-5-202(1), C.R.S. (2013) Crim. P. 7(b)(2) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c).

For the aforementioned reasons, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, respectfully requests that this Court DISMISS with PREJUDICE 14GS000200.

By:  /s/ ~BbB~

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, No. 1


***Motion to Dismiss for Want of Due Prosecution Part II***

~amended 02.08.15~

TABLE OF/CONTENTS

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV.  ARGUMENT

Procedural Due Process

Double Jeopardy

V.  CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981)

Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975)

Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 *1295 (1974)

Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966)

Jordan v. People, 155 Colo. 224, 393 P.2d 745 (1964)

People v. Saiz, 923 P2d 197 (11/24/95)

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971)

People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P.2d 260 (1973)

Valdez v. People, 174 Colo. 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971)

Jaramillo v. Dist Ct, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971)

People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d , 165 (Colo. 1997)

People v. Scales, 763 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1988)

People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 592 (Colo. 1997)

People v. Bates, 155 Colo. 277, 280-81, 394 P.2d 134, 136 (1964)

People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237, 242 (Colo. 2005)

People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Colo. 1982)

People v. Colantonio, 196 Colo. 242, 244, 583 P.2d 919, 921 (1978)

People v. Roberts, 146 P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. 2006)

Ex parte Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938)

Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1985)

United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)

United States v. Whiffen, 121 F3d 18, 08/29/97

United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir 1993)

Other Authorities

C.M.C.R. 248(b)

U.S.Const. Amend. VI

Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 6

C.R.S. 18-1-405

Crim.P. 48(b)(1)

C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a)

Federal Court Rules Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G)

Speedy Trial Act of 1974

18 U.S.C.A. § 3161

18-1-405, C.R.S (1986 & 1996 Supp.)

Procedural due process

Colo. Crim. P. 37

C.R.S. 18-1-405, Speedy Trial

Speedy Trial Act

Fifth Amendment, USC

Fourteenth Amendment, USC

16 of art. II, Colo. Const.

USCS 3161, Time Limits & Exclusions

C.R.S. 18-1-301

 I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

The false allegations in this case are/were that on December 23, 2013, Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher was terminated by his employer and that after leaving the building, Bramscher repeatedly called River Rock Dispensary harassing the employees by using foul language and threatening them.  The General Sessions Summons and Complaint was issued and signed by Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 who is currently on paid leave as reported by The Denver Channel.

On February 11, 2014, Judge Johnny C. Barajas DISMISSED 14GS000200 ruling, “Okay, well it does say it has to be a brief description, so that suggests to me that there has to be more than just the boxes being checked off.  So I am going to go ahead and dismiss it without prejudice” (pg. 14, 5-9) TRANSCRIPT

On February 12, 2015, Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a “NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL” with the District Court 2014CV030627.

On April 25, 2015, Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CASE DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE” with the Municipal Court Judge Johnny C. Barajas 74 days or 2 months and 15 days after this case was dismissed according to rule/law.

On May 20, 2015, Municipal Court and Judge Johnny C. Barajas granted the prosecutions 04/25/15 motion reinstating this case 99 days or 3 months and 10 days after Barajas did dismiss this case according to rule/law.

On July 10, 2015, 161 days or 5 months and 11 days after the Arraignment and William Robert “Billy bob” Bramschers’ “Not Guilty” plea on January 31, 2014 Municipal Court Judge Johnny C. Barajas restarts SPEEDY TRIAL.

On September 09, 2014 the APPEAL to the District Court 2014CV030627 orchestrated and authored by Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 is DISMISSED and ENDED.

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant Bramscher was charged with violating the Denver Revised Municipal Code, Section 38-91 (Disturbance by Use of Telephone) and 38-92(a) (Threats).  Case 14GS000200 was dismissed according to rule and law on 02/11/15 and the Denver City Attorney’s failed to file the “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION” within the TIME FRAME allowable under STATE and FEDERAL law and this court fatally lacks jurisdiction.

The state of Colorado specifies that for any MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION the Defendant (i.e., William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher) or the Prosecution (i.e., Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197) according to rule, law and statute had ONLY 35 days to file a Motion for Reconsideration and Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 KNOWINGLY, VINDICTIVELY, and MALICIOUSLY filed their motion 74 days or 2 months and 15 days after this case was dismissed according to rule/law.  See C.M.C.R. 237; Crim. P. 37. which was accepted by Judge Johnny C. Barajas – and act of Judicial Misconduct.

The trial in this case was set beyond the ninety-day speedy trial period established by C.M.C.R. 248(b). Under C.M.C.R. 248(b), charges against the defendant must be dismissed “[i]f the trial of a defendant is delayed more than ninety days after the arraignment of the defendant . . . unless the delay is  occasioned by the action or request of the defendant.” C.M.C.R. 248(b) (emphasis added). Today we hold that the delay in this case was NOT attributable to the defendant and William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, Pro se.

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant must assert right. A criminal defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; but he does have a responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981).  Right to a speedy trial has been formulated to force the prosecution to try a defendant promptly in compliance with the statutes, rules, and constitutional requirements of each case. People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975).

The constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relating to a speedy trial cannot support a claim for relief when a factual basis does not appear in the record. U.S.Const. Amend. VI; Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 6; C.R.S. 18-1-405; Crim.P. 48(b)(1); Speedy Trial Act of 1974; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161.

In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to afford a speedy trial that complies with a statutory mandate, a court must conduct a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo. 1997) (discussing section 18-1-405, C.R.S (1986 & 1996 Supp.) and finding that “[t]o whom the trial delay beyond the speedy trial date is properly chargeable is an ad hoc inquiry’.” (quoting People v. Scales,763 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1988)) (emphasis in original)). In addressing the trial court’s role, we look to whether its actions with regard to the applicable speedy trial provision were reasonable under the facts of the case before it. See e.g., People  ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 592 (Colo. 1997) (holding dismissal of charges necessary when trial court’s unreasonable refusal to try to appoint defense counsel who could appear within the speedy trial period caused the delay); Arledge, 938 P.2d at 167 (finding that recused trial judge acted inappropriately when he obtained a speedy trial waiver instead of immediately dispatching the case for reassignment).

Both our rule and the statute require that a defendant be brought to trial within six months after the entry of a plea of not guilty.  See C.R.S. 18-1-405(1); Crim.P. 48(b)(1). See also Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 *1295 (1974). The burden, however, is upon the defendant to establish that he has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the statute or rule or that his constitutional right to a speedy trial requires dismissal. See People v. O’Neill, 185 Colo. 202, 523 P. 2d 123 (1974); Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966); Jordan v. People, 155 Colo. 224, 393 P.2d 745 (1964).  People v. Saiz, 923 P2d 197 (11/24/95); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).

In order to determine whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, it is necessary to make an ad hoc judgment based on the facts of each case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971); Potter v. District Court, supra.  Factors to be considered include length of delay, the reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and any prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, supra; Potter v. District Court, supra; People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P.2d 260 (1973).

Procedural due process

Procedural due process refers to the aspects of the due process clause that relate to the procedure of arresting and trying persons who have been accused of crimes.  It also applies to any other government action that deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.  According to the principle of procedural due process, if a person is deprived life, liberty, or property, s/he is entitled to adequate notice, hearing, counsel, and a neutral judge.  This principle follows the concept of fundamental fairness.

Procedural due process requires the state and federal governments to follow certain procedures in criminal and civil matters.  By placing such restrictions, it limits the government’s exercise of power.

IV.  ARGUMENT

Quoting Cornell University Law School, “The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be ‘deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’ The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states. These words have as their central promise an assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law (‘legality’) and provide fair procedures.”

NOTE:  Speedy Trial pursuant C.R.S. 18-1-405 and pursuant to C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a)

Case Law:  The right to a speedy trial is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions in essentially the same language (Valdez v. People, 174 Colo. 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971); Jaramillo v. Dist Ct, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971); People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P2d 15 (1972); Lucero v. People, 173 Colo. 94, 476 P2d 257 (1970)).

Case Law:  Right of accused to speedy trial is an important right and when the constitutional mandate is invoked, the matter should receive careful consideration by the by the courts (Ex Parte Russo, 104 Colo. 91, 88 P2d 953 (1939)).

Case Law:  The right to a speedy trial is not only for the benefit of the accused, but also for the protection of the public.  It is essential that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished (Jaramillo, supra).

Case Law:  It is duty of prosecutor and trial judge to secure and protect the defendant’s right to speedy trial (People v. Chavez, 779 P2d 375 (Colo. 1989); People v. Abeyta, Montoya & Santistevan, 195 Colo 338, 578 P2d 645 (05/08/1/78)).

C.R.S. & Rules:  18-1-105(6)(a) and Federal Court Rules Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G) establish time limits and exclusions.

TITLE 18. CRIMINAL CODE  
ARTICLE 1.PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO OFFENSES GENERALLY  
PART 4. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT
C.R.S. 18-1-405 (2014)


18-1-405. Speedy trial

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.

(2) If trial results in conviction which is reversed on appeal, any new trial must be commenced within six months after the date of the receipt by the trial court of the mandate from the appellate court.

(3) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.

(3.5) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date of the defendant’s next appearance.

(4) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is provided in subsection (1) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open court of record expressly agrees to the continuance or unless the defendant without making an appearance before the court in person or by his counsel files a dated written waiver of his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to this section and files an agreement to the continuance signed by the defendant. The time for trial, in the event of such agreement, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continuance and the date to which trial is continued.

(5) To be entitled to a dismissal under subsection (1) of this section, the defendant must move for dismissal prior to the commencement of his trial and prior to any pretrial motions which are set for hearing immediately before the trial or prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge or an included offense. Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s rights under this section.

(5.1) If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.

(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:

(a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after the issue of the defendant’s mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised;

(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution;

(c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance;

(d) The period of delay resulting from the voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; however, a defendant shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained, or he resists being returned to the state for trial;

(e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial;

(f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant;

(g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if:

(I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state’s case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date; or

(II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification;

(h) The period of delay between the new date set for trial following the expiration of the time periods excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of this subsection (6), not to exceed three months;

(i) The period of delay between the filing of a motion pursuant to section 18-1-202 (11) and any decision by the court regarding such motion, and if such decision by the court transfers the case to another county, the period of delay until the first appearance of all the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred, and in such event the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall apply.

(7) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the case is subsequently transferred to a court in another county, the period within which trial must be had is extended for an additional three months from the date of the first appearance of all of the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred.

Procedural due process

Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher petitions this court that 14GS2000200 is a vindictive and malicious prosecution based on a bad-faith investigation.  Bramscher has (1) suffered injury in fact deprived of fundamental fairness, (2) this deprivation constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty, property, and (3) DISMISSAL with PREJUDICE is required.

The fundamental right of an accused to a speedy trial arises from § 16 of art. II, Colo. Const. This section must be regarded as having been enacted for the purpose of rendering the constitutional guaranty effective and providing a method of securing the right declared. Ex parte Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938), overruled on other grounds in Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1985)See, C.R.S. 18-1-405; USCS 3161.

Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits anyone from being prosecuted twice for substantially the same crime.  See, United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); C.R.S. 18-1-301.

Citing People v Westendorf, 37 Colo App 111, 11/13/75, “An insufficient indictment does not legally charge a crime or subject defendant to the jurisdiction of the court” and an Information is sufficiently particular if it elucidates the elements of a crime, enlightens a defendant as to the nature of the charges against which he must defend and enables him to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense (see United States v. Whiffen, 121 F3d 18, 08/29/97; see also United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir 1993).

 V.  CONCLUSION

Delays attributable to the court or the prosecutor that result in a trial date that falls past the applicable speedy trial deadline require the dismissal of charges against the defendant. C.M.C.R. 248(b). Such delays may include, for example, delays resulting from a prosecutor’s lack of diligence, a court’s congested docket, a court’s refusal to set trial within the speedy trial period after granting prosecutor’s motion for continuance, a court’s refusal to timely select a new venue, a court’s dilatory ruling, or a prosecutor’s untimely actions. See Arledge, 938 P.2d at 165-66.

For the aforementioned reasons, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, respectfully requests that this Court DISMISS with PREJUDICE 14GS000200.

By:  /s/ ~BbB~

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, No. 1


***Motion for the Court to Comport to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV.  ARGUMENT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Claflin v. Houseman (1876) 93 US 130, 3 OTTO 130, 23 L Ed 833

Adskim v. Oregon W.R. & N. Co. (1929)

People ex rel Leach v. Baldwin (1930) 341 111 604, 174 NE

Waite v. Dowley (1877) 94 US 527, 4 OTTO 527, 24 L Ed 181

Tarble’s Case (1871) 80 US 397, 13 WALL 397, 20 L Ed 597

Florida v. Mellon (1927) 273 US 12, 47 S Ct 265, 71 L Ed 511, 1 USTC 205, 6 AFTR 6416

Other Authorities

USC ART III Clause I Subjects of Jurisdiction

USC ART VI Clause 2 Supreme Law

Communications Act of 1934

47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.

Communications Decency Act of 1996

47 §§ USCS 223 et seq.

Supreme Law of the Land

Fifth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

The false allegations in this case are/were that on December 23, 2013, Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher was terminated by his employer and that after leaving the building, Bramscher repeatedly called River Rock Dispensary harassing the employees by using foul language and threatening them. The General Sessions Summons and Complaint was issued and signed by Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 who is currently on paid leave as reported by The Denver Channel.

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant Bramscher was charged with violating the Denver Revised Municipal Code, Section 38-91 (Disturbance by Use of Telephone) and 38-92(a) (Threats). Case 14GS000200 was dismissed according to rule and law on 02/11/14 and the Denver City Attorney’s failed to file the “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION” within the TIME FRAME allowable under STATE and FEDERAL rule/law and this court fatally lacks jurisdiction.  These malicious and vindictive unconstitutional charges are muliplicitous.

The speech & conduct in question case 14GS000200/2014CV030627/2014SA318 is the product of falsely alleged interstate telephone communication(s) under the jurisdiction of Congress and Federal Courts.  (See USC ART III Clause I Subjects of Jurisdiction; USC ART VI Clause 2 Supreme Law; see also Communications Act of 1934 (47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.); Communications Decency Act of 1996; see e.g., 47 §§ USCS 223 et seq. “Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications” United States Code Service.

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

Valid Federal Laws are part of the Supreme Law of the Land, and state may not discriminate against rights created by or arising under such laws and a Federal Statue cannot be invalidated under State Constitution.  Valid Federal Laws are part of the Supreme Law of the Land, and state may not discriminate against rights created by or arising under such laws and a Federal Statue cannot be invalidated under State Constitution.

“Federal laws are as much Law of Land in any state as state laws are” (Claflin v. Houseman (1876) 93 US 130, 3 OTTO 130, 23 L Ed 833) and state courts must follow construction of Federal Statutes as laid down by Federal Courts” (Adskim v. Oregon W.R. & N. Co. (1929) 129 OR 169, 276 P 1094).

“Construction of Constitution and statutes of United States Supreme Court is controlling on all courts of the union whether state or federal” (People ex rel Leach v. Baldwin (1930) 341 111 604, 174 NE 51).  “Where there exists concurrent right of legislation in states and in Congress, and latter has exercised its power, there remains in states no authority to legislate on same matter” (Waite v. Dowley (1877) 94 US 527, 4 OTTO 527, 24 L Ed 181).  “Whenever any conflict arises between enactments of the United States and State, those of national government have supremacy” (Tarble’s Case (1871) 80 US 397, 13 WALL 397, 20 L Ed 597).

“Whenever any conflict arises between enactments of the United States and State, those of national government have supremacy” (see Tarble’s Case (1871) 80 US 397, 13 WALL 397, 20 L Ed 597).  “Federal Constitution and Laws Enacted under it prevail over laws of state” (see Florida v Mellon (1927) 273 US 12, 47 S Ct 265, 71 L Ed 511, 1 USTC 205, 6 AFTR 6416).

IV.  ARGUMENT

Quoting Cornell University Law School, “The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be ‘deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’ The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states. These words have as their central promise an assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law (‘legality’) and provide fair procedures.”

By: /s/ ~BbB~

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, No. 1


***Motion for the Prosecution to Elect between Muliplicitous Counts before Trial***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV.  ARGUMENT

Substantial Due Process

Procedural Due Process

Double Jeopardy

V.  CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005)

United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1991)

People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. App. 2010)

People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo. 1991)

Lucero v. People, No. 05CA2142, 10SC72 (2012)

Roberts v. People, 203 P.3d 513, 516 (Colo. 2009)

Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128-33 (Colo. 2001)

United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006)

Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984)

United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997)

United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)

People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379, 381 (Colo. 1994)

People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P3.d 827, 835 (Colo. App. 2005)

People v. Rhea, COA 60. No. 12CA1133 (05/08/2014)

Other Authorities

Fourth Amendment, USC

Fifth Amendment, USC

Sixth Amendment, USC

Fourteenth Amendment, USC

I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS

The false allegations in this case are/were that on December 23, 2013, Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher was terminated by his employer and that after leaving the building, Bramscher repeatedly called River Rock Dispensary harassing the employees by using foul language and threatening them. The General Sessions Summons and Complaint was issued and signed by Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 who is currently on paid leave as reported by The Denver Channel.

II.  STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant Bramscher was charged with violating the Denver Revised Municipal Code, Section 38-91 (Disturbance by Use of Telephone) and 38-92(a) (Threats). Case 14GS000200 was dismissed according to rule and law on 02/11/15 and the Denver City Attorney’s failed to file the “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION” within the TIME FRAME allowable under STATE and FEDERAL law and this court fatally lacks jurisdiction.

The charges are multiplicious and following rule, law and case history the prosecution is required to select from the muliplicious charges.

III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in several counts, culminating in multiple punishments.” See Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005). “The chief danger raised by a multiplicitous indictment is the possibility that the defendant will receive more than one sentence for a single offense.” United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Multiplicitous convictions are prohibited because they violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.”).

“[T]he multiplicitous bar is at the core of the prohibition against double jeopardy.” Quintano, 105 P.3d at 590. Thus, “[a]nalysis of whether convictions should be merged must . . . be based on double jeopardy principles.” People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo. 1991).  The Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. 5, embraces “three separate but related prohibitions: (1) a rule which bars a reprosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a rule barring reprosecution for the same offense after conviction, and; (3) a rule barring multiple punishment for the same offense.” Henderson, 810 P.2d at 1060 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Colorado cases provide a framework for deciding when a defendant’s conduct may support multiple punishments and thus withstand a double jeopardy challenge. See, e.g., Roberts, 203 P.3d at 516; Quintano, 105 P.3d at 590-91. But the parties have not cited — nor have we found — a Colorado case addressing whether merger at sentencing would cure double jeopardy concerns arising from multiplicitous charges and jury convictions. See Lucero v. People, No. 05CA2142, 10SC72 (2012) (addressing multiplicitous convictions as an illegal sentence); Roberts v. People, 203 P.3d 513, 516 (Colo. 2009), superseded by statute, ch. 244, sec. 2, § 18-4-401(4)(a), 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 1099-1100 (addressing “unit of prosecution” for theft statute); Vigil, 251 P.3d at 449 (addressing double jeopardy concerns of multiplicitous convictions sua sponte); cf. Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128-33 (Colo. 2001) (vacating conviction where the defendant entered guilty plea and was sentenced for two convictions based on the same transaction, while the General Assembly had authorized punishment for only one).

In each of these cases, the defendant sustained multiple convictions based on charges that the appellate court held were multiplicitous. While the courts in Lucer and Vigil, 251 P.3d at 451, directed that the multiplicitous theft convictions be merged on resentencing, neither court addressed whether a trial court has discretion to allow a jury to consider multiplicitous charges, provided that any multiplicitous convictions are merged at sentencing. Nor do these cases consider possible prejudice to a defendant from trial of multiplicitous charges, beyond multiple convictions. The federal circuits have addressed these issues, as follows.

While the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from multiple punishments for the same offense, “[w]here there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so long as no more than one punishment is eventually imposed.” United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) (“While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [a defendant] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.”).

Thus, when faced with multiplicitous charges, a trial court may take one of two courses. The court may exercise its discretion “to require the prosecution to elect between multiplicitous counts before trial.” United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997). Where, as here, multiplicity is both raised before trial and clear at that time, multiplicitous counts should be eliminated before trial because doing so would avoid the due process inquiry discussed below.

Courts have recognized two potential due process concerns in allowing a jury to consider multiplicitous charges. First, such charges increase the risk that the jury may reach a compromise verdict. See Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1426. Second, the jury could be exposed to different — and potentially more prejudicial — evidence when a defendant is tried on multiplicitous counts rather than on just one charge. See United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

IV.  ARGUMENT

Substantial Due Process

The substantive limitations placed on the content or subject matter of state and federal laws by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same eleven words, called the Due Process Clause, to describe a legal obligation of all states. These words have as their central promise an assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the law (“legality”) and provide fair procedures. Most of this essay concerns that promise. We should briefly note, however, three other uses these words have had in American constitutional law.

Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process refers to the aspects of the due process clause that relate to the procedure of arresting and trying persons who have been accused of crimes. It also applies to any other government action that deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property. According to the principle of procedural due process, if a person is deprived life, liberty, or property, s/he is entitled to adequate notice, hearing, counsel, and a neutral judge. This principle follows the concept of fundamental fairness.

Procedural due process requires the state and federal governments to follow certain procedures in criminal and civil matters. By placing such restrictions, it limits the government’s exercise of power.

Double Jeopardy

Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher petitions that the charges of DRMC 38-91 and 38-92 as applied violate the United States Federal Constitutions Double jeopardy protections.  The Double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions protect an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offenses.  U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo. Const. art. II., 18See Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) (“same elements” test); People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379, 381 (Colo. 1994);  People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P3.d 827, 835 (Colo. App. 2005); See also C.R.S. 18-1-408(1).

Citing People v. Rhea, COA 60. No. 12CA1133 (05/08/2014) “Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in several counts, culminating in multiple punishments.”  See Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005).  “The chief danger raised by a multiplicitious indictment is the possibility that the defendant will receive more than one sentence for a single offense.”  United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1991); see also People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. App. 2010) “constitutional prohibition” against double jeopardy.

V.  CONCLUSION

Comparing the elements of “Disturbance By Use Of Telephone” and “Threat” as falsely, vindictively and maliciously alleged, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, protests a double jeopardy violation.  The defense petitions this court to force the prosecution to elect between multiplicitous counts before trial.

For the aforementioned reasons, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, respectfully requests that this Court grants the defendants Motion for the Prosecution to Elect between Muliplicitous Counts before Trial.

By: /s/ ~BbB~

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, No. 1


When you truly love yourself you are able to love our world…

~Billy bob Bramscher

~début~

FACEBOOK:  Blue Dakini

“I am the blue lightning which shatters locks and chains…”

~BbB~

What TIME is IT?  Time to love and be loved; tune IN drop IN!!!

我會教你真相與通往真理的道路。
他已經看到了真相,已經達到真理,已經知道真相,已經滲透到了真理,已經越過無疑是不動搖。
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