Notice of Claim C.R.S. 24-10-109 Denver City and County, Colorado

Denver Seal

“Honesty is the first chapter in the book of wisdom.”

~Thomas Jefferson, 3rd President of the United States of America, EARTH

“If you tell the truth, you don’t have to remember anything.”

~Mark Twain


STORYLINE:  In sum hours I am scheduled for a trial by jury in Denver City and County Court on unconstitutional charges dismissed according to rule, law and statute 363 days ago on 02.11.15.

I composed an email to broadcast regarding this patriotic cause electronically delivered to:

1) 9 News

2) CBS 4 Denver

3) The Denver Channel

4) KDVR

5) The Denver Post

6) The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee

7) The Colorado Senate Local Government Committee

8) Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System

9) House Judiciary

10)  Legislative Council

***and tomorrow personal delivery before trial***

1) The Colorado Supreme Court

2) Attorney Regulation Counsel – Colo. Supreme Court

3) Cynthia Coffman Attorney General Colorado Department of Law

4) Mayor Michael B. Hancock

5) Denver Board of Ethics

6) Denver City and County Court, 3H

EMAIL:

I am William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher Volunteer Lobbyist, Advocate for the Colorado Cross

Disability Coalition, Lifetime Member of Psi Chi The International Honor Society in Psychology,

Gonzo journalist, Activist, Outlaw Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer and I AM recognized by the Federal

Government as disABLED.  Please help ME help Colorado!!!

The following email is humbly delivered with Faith, Hope and Charity to the following parties:

2014SA318 Notice of Claim C.R.S. §24-10-109 BRAMSCHER, William R.

Today, February 9th, 2015 I am scheduled for a jury trial in Denver City and County court 3H in a case that was dismissed according to rule, law and statute 366 days ago, 02/11/14.  I am the victim of a bad-faith investigation, malicious prosecution, vindictive prosecution, judicial misconduct and conspiracy.

The accused, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher has been denied the constitutional right to SPEEDY TRIAL and “If the constitution, that statutes, the rules or case law require dismissal, it is the duty of the trial court to order that the case be dismissed.” (See Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975)) and “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law” from the Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article II, Bill of Rights.

Please find to follow a link to a WordPress Blog that details this alarming and urgent issue with truth and accuracy.  I personally invite each of you to attend this trial and experience this truth.  If you have any questions or comments please feel free to contact me.  Contact information is below this link:

https://lonesomelozer.wordpress.com/2015/02/09/notice-of-claim-c-r-s-24-10-109-denver-city-and-county-colorado/

A special #Aloha to Kevin Lundberg and family…

Your compassion and action are wholeheartedly appreciated and expected…

~Billy bob Bramscher

~BbB~


William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher

v.

The City and County of Denver, et seq.

Municipal Case Number: 14GS000200

District Court Case Number: 2014CV030627

Colorado Supreme Court Case Number: 2014SA318

~right to petition the government for a redress of grievances~

William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher, Pro se

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE(S)

(to include yet not be limited to)

Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 

1311 West 46th Avenue Denver, CO

City Attorney Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157

1437 Bannock Street #353, Denver, CO 80202

City Attorney Megan A. Jones, No. 40197

1437 Bannock Street #353, Denver, CO 80202

Unknown Current City Attorney(s)

1437 Bannock Street #353, Denver, CO 80202

Judge Johnny C. Barajas City and County of Denver

520 West Colfax Avenue, Denver, CO

Judge B. Faragher City and County of Denver

520 West Colfax Avenue, Denver, CO


~legend~

CONSISE STATEMENT

Statement of Facts

Statement of Case

Information

Speedy Trial

Standard of Review

ARGUMENT

Bad-faith investigation

Vindictive prosecution & Malicious prosecution

Judicial misconduct

CONCLUSION

Information

Speedy Trial

Monetary Damages Requested

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

People v. Williams, 961 P2d 533 (Colo. App. 1997)

People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975)

Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971)

People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973)

People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973)

People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973)

People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)

Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226, 176 P. 280 (1918)

Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924)

Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932)

Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943)

Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 F.2d 447 (1947)

Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961)

Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972)

Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972)

People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944)

People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003)

Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 *1295 (1974)

People v. O’Neill, 185 Colo. 202, 523 P. 2d 123 (1974)

Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966)

Jordan v. People, 155 Colo. 224, 393 P.2d 745 (1964)

People v. Saiz, 923 P2d 197 (11/24/95)

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)

Hustler Magazine & Larry C. Flynt v. Jerry Falwell, 485 US 46, 99 L Ed 2d 41, 108 S Ct 876 [no 86-1278] 02/24/88

United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 552, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875)

McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985)

McDonald, ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2788

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 322-23, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963)

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-11, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3422-25, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982)

California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611-12, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972)

Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996)

Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000)

Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002)

Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005)

Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975)

Jefferson County Health Svcs. Ass’n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001 (Colo. 1998)

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)

People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo. 1981)

People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93, 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978)

People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37, 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975)

People v. Fueston I, 717 P.2d at 982-82 (Colo. App. 1985)

People v. Westendorf, 37Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975)

People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo. 1997)

People v. Scales, 763 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1988)

People  ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 592 (Colo. 1997)

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971)

People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P.2d 260 (1973)

People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968)

People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269, 270 (Colo. 1983)

People v. Hunter, 666 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1983)

People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 496, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971)

Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 413, 444 F.2d 267, 269 (1968)

United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (188[1])

People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981)

People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975)

Valdez v. People, 174 Colo. 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971)

Jaramillo v. Dist Ct, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971)

People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P2d 15 (1972)

Lucero v. People, 173 Colo. 94, 476 P2d 257 (1970)

People v. Chavez, 779 P2d 375 (Colo. 1989)

People v. Abeyta, Montoya & Santistevan, 195 Colo. 338, 578 P2d 645 (05/08/1/78)

United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles (1931, CA2 NY) 52 F2d 49

Sergeant v. People, 177 Colo 354, 497 P2d 983 (1972)

Stewart v. Donges, 915 F2d 572, 582-83 (10th Cir 1990)

People v. Winden, 689 P2d 578, 582 (Colo 1984)

United States v. Martin

Cruse v. State, 584 P2d 1141 Alaska (1978)

People v. Kurland, 28 CAL 3d 376, 618 P2d 213, 168 CAL RPTR 667 (1980), cert denied, 451 US 987, 101 S Ct 2321, 68 L Ed 2d 844 (1981)

People v. Walker, 180 Colo 84, 504 P2d 1098 (1972)

People v. Drake, 841 P2d 364 (Colo App 1992)

People v. Elliston, 181 Colo 118, 508 P2d 379 (1973)

Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., 47 F. Supp. 290, 293 (D.N.Y. 1942)

United States v. Jenkins, 537 F3d 1, 3 (1st Cir 2008)

United States v. Goodwin, 457 US 368, 372, 102 S Ct 2485, 73 L Ed 2d 74 (1982)

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 363, 98 S Ct 663, 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978)

United States v. Goodwin, 576 F Supp. 2d 235, 237 (D.P.R. 2008)

United States v. Tobin, 598 F Supp. 2d 125, 02/18/2009)

New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 273, II L Ed 2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964)

United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 US 217, 222, 19 L Ed 2d 426, 88 S Ct 353 (1967)

Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 75 L Ed 2d 708, 103 S Ct 1684 (1983)

Roth v. United States, 354 US 476, 484, 1 L Ed 2d 1498, 77 S Ct 1304, 14 OHIO Ops 2d 331 (1957)

Hustler Magazine & Larry C. Flynt v. Jerry Falwell, 485 US 46, 99 L Ed 2d 41, 108 S Ct 876 [no 86-1278] 02/24/88

Baumgartner v. United States, 522 U.S. 655, 673-674, 88 L Ed 1525, 64 S Ct 1240 (1944)

Monitor Patriot Co v. Roy (1971)

People v. Marinez, 185 Colo. 187 (1974)

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510, 47 S Ct 437, 71 L Ed 749 (1927)

Whitaker v. McClean, 73 APP DC 259, 118 F2d 596  (1941)

Cf. Berger v. United States, 255 US 22, 65 L Ed 481, 41 S Ct 230 (1921)

Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11 (1954)

In Re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582-83 (D Colo. 2000)

Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments, 980 P2d 973, 977 (Colo. 1999)

People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P2d 951 (1971)

People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980)

Falgout v. People, 170 Colo. 32, 459 P2d 572, (1969)

People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P2d (1973)

People v. Buggs, 186 Colo. 13, 525 P2d 421 (1974)

Gefland v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 586 P2d 1331 (1978)

PV v. District Court, 609 P. 2d 110, 199 Colo. 357 (1978)

People v. Hayward, 55 P3d 803 (Colo. App 2002)

Dikeman v. Charnes, 739 P2d 870 (Colo. App 1987)

Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, (93 L Ed 1879, P2d 983 (1949)

Other Authorities

C.R.S. 18-1-405(1)

Crim.P. 48(b)(1)

English Bill of Rights of 1689

Glorious Revolution of 1688

A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights 69, 73 (1971)

Stamp Act Congress’ Declaration of Rights and Grievances of 1765

Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress of 1774. See 1 Schwartz at 198, 217

C.R.S. §24-10-109

Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure 2.10, at 114 (1996)

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)

18-1-405, C.R.S (1986 & 1996 Supp.)

C.R.S. 18-1-405

C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a)

18-1-105(6)(a)

FrCP Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G)

C.M.C.R. 248(b)

CRPC Rule 3.8(a)

Fifth Amendment

CRCP 16 Committee cmt.

CRCivilP Chap. 20 251.4

Fourth Amendment

Crim. P. 203(a)

Crim. P. 204(b)(4)

Fourteenth Amendment

Crim. P. 7(b)(1)

Section 16-5-202(1)C.R.S. (2013)

Crim. P. 7(b)(2)

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)

C.M.C.R. 248(b)

Speedy Trial Act

Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article II

42 USC § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights


CONSISE STATEMENT

My name is William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher and I am a victim of a bad-faith investigation, vindictive prosecution, malicious prosecution, judicial misconduct, First Amendment Retaliation by a non-employeer and other civil rights violations including conspiracy committed by agents under color-of-state and the jurisdiction of the City and County of Denver, Federal rule, law and statute.

Bramscher has (1) suffered injury in fact deprived of fundamental fairness, (2) this deprivation constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty, property, and (3) Restitution is required.

Statement of Facts

The false allegations in this case are/were that on December 23, 2013, Defendant William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher was terminated by his employer and that after leaving the building, Bramscher repeatedly called River Rock Dispensary harassing the employees by using foul language and threatening them.  The General Sessions Summons and Complaint was issued and signed by Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405 who is currently on paid leave as reported by The Denver Channel.

On February 11, 2014, Judge Johnny C. Barajas DISMISSED 14GS000200 ruling, “Okay, well it does say it has to be a brief description, so that suggests to me that there has to be more than just the boxes being checked off.  So I am going to go ahead and dismiss it without prejudice” (pg. 14, 5-9) TRANSCRIPT

On February 12, 2014, Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a “NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL” with the District Court 2014CV030627.

On April 25, 2014, Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 filed a “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CASE DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE” with the Municipal Court Judge Johnny C. Barajas 74 days or 2 months and 15 days after this case was dismissed according to rule/law.

On May 20, 2014, Municipal Court and Judge Johnny C. Barajas granted the prosecutions 04/25/15 motion reinstating this case 99 days or 3 months and 10 days after Barajas did dismiss this case according to rule/law.

On July 10, 2014, 161 days or 5 months and 11 days after the Arraignment and William Robert “Billy bob” Bramschers’ “Not Guilty” plea on January 31, 2014 Municipal Court Judge Johnny C. Barajas restarts SPEEDY TRIAL.

On August 29, 2014 Jury Fee Waived.

On August 29, 2014 Judge B. Faragher rules “This court will not change JB’s decision [to reinstate case].

On September 09, 2014 the APPEAL to the District Court 2014CV030627 orchestrated and authored by Denver City Attorney’s Vincent A. DiCroce, No. 23157 and Megan A. Jones, No. 40197 is DISMISSED and ENDED.

On October 31, 2014 SUPREME COURT PETITION FILED

On February 9, 2015 this unconstitutional case is scheduled for a trial by jury.

Statement of Case

Information

Citing People v. Williams, 961 P2d 533 (Colo. App. 1997), “A substantive defect in an information may be raised at any time during the proceedings.”  “Sufficiency of information is matter of jurisdiction.” (See People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 946 (1975)).

An information is sufficient if it advises a defendant of the offense with which he is charged. (See Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566 (1971)People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364 (1973); People v. Flanders, 183 Colo. 268, 516 P.2d 418 (1973)People v. Gnout, 183 Colo. 366, 517 P.2d 394 (1973); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).  And can be understood by the jury. An information is sufficient if the charge is in language from which the nature of the offense may be readily understood by the accused and jury. (See Tracy v. People, 65 Colo. 226, 176 P. 280 (1918); Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924); Albert v. People, 90 Colo. 219, 7 P.2d 822 (1932)Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789 (1943)Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 F.2d 447 (1947); Ciccarelli v. People, 147 Colo. 413, 364 P.2d 368 (1961); Loggins v. People, 178 Colo. 439, 498 P.2d 1146 (1972); Olguin v. People, 179 Colo. 26, 497 P.2d 1254 (1972); People v. Warner, 112 Colo. 565, 151 P.2d 975 (1944); People v. Palmer, 87 P.3d 137 (Colo. App. 2003).

Speedy Trial

Both our rule and the statute require that a defendant be brought to trial within six months after the entry of a plea of not guilty.  (See C.R.S. 18-1-405(1); Crim.P. 48(b)(1). See also Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 *1295 (1974)). The burden, however, is upon the defendant to establish that he has been denied a speedy trial in violation of the statute or rule or that his constitutional right to a speedy trial requires dismissal. See People v. O’Neill, 185 Colo. 202, 523 P. 2d 123 (1974); Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966)Jordan v. People, 155 Colo. 224, 393 P.2d 745 (1964).  People v. Saiz, 923 P2d 197 (11/24/95)Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).

Standard of Review

Citing Hustler Magazine & Larry C. Flynt v. Jerry Falwell, 485 US 46, 99 L Ed 2d 41, 108 S Ct 876 [no 86-1278] 02/24/88, “The right to petition the Government is part of our heritage from earliest times and represents a cornerstone of our national liberty. It is a right long-recognized as implicit in ‘[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form’.”  See United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 552, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875).  As the Supreme Court noted in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), the historical roots of the petition clause long antedate the Constitution. 472 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. at 2788. The English Bill of Rights of 1689, enacted after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, guaranteed “the right of the subjects to petition the King.” 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2. The early colonists in Massachusetts included a petition clause in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, “the first detailed American Charter of Liberties.” See 1 B. Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights 69, 73 (1971). During the Revolutionary period, the right to petition was again raised as an essential ingredient of self-government in both the Stamp Act Congress’ Declaration of Rights and Grievances of 1765 and the Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress of 1774. See 1 Schwartz at 198, 217. Now guaranteed by the First Amendment, the right to petition “is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression.” McDonald, ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2788; see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 322-23, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (right to petition inseparable from other First Amendment rights). Accordingly, courts have protected this right when its existence has arisen in varied contexts, from prisons, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972), to state capitols, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963).  And they have protected this right in varied forms, from peaceful boycotts of private businesses, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-11, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3422-25, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), to appeals to one or all three branches of the Government, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611-12, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972).

The purpose of the notice requirement C.R.S. §24-10-109 is to permit a public entity to conduct a prompt investigation of the claim, to remedy any dangerous condition, to make adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, and to prepare a defense to the claim. Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996); Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2000); Gallagher v. Univ. of N. Colo., 18 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo. 2002); Awad v. Breeze, 129 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2005).  See also Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975); Jefferson County Health Svcs. Ass’n v. Feeney, 974 P.2d 1001 (Colo. 1998).

Information

Colorado has followed the modern trend of testing the sufficiency of the information based upon the fundamental objectives the information serves rather than technical pleading requirements of the common law. See Robert J. Dieter, Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure 2.10, at 114 (1996). This functional approach mirrors the efforts of the federal criminal code and follows the lead of the Supreme Court. (See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) noting that a charging document is sufficient if it, “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (liberalizing the technical common law pleading requirements).

We are aware that, in some cases, lack of specificity has been held to constitute a fatal defect in the charging document. But we view those cases as distinguishable because, in each case, the defect would have precluded the preparation of a meaningful defense. See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 631 P.2d 162, 164 (Colo. 1981) (indictment should have been dismissed as vague because it did not allege how the embezzlement was accomplished); People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 292-93, 586 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1978) (indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the money or property allegedly converted and failed to indicate how the money or property was used); People v. Broncucia, 189 Colo. 334, 336-37, 540 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1975) (perjury charge was fatally defective because it “failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the falsity of the defendant’s statements so as to enable him to prepare his defense”); People v. Fueston I, 717 P.2d at 982-82 (Colo. App. 1985) (information was fatally defective because it “failed to allege which of the many statements contained in the defendant’s 1982 liquor license renewal application were false”); People v. Westendorf, 37Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975) (indictment was fatally defective because it “contains no statements which are alleged to have been perjurious”).

Speedy Trial

In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to afford a speedy trial that complies with a statutory mandate, a court must conduct a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo. 1997) (discussing section 18-1-405, C.R.S (1986 & 1996 Supp.) and finding that “[t]o whom the trial delay beyond the speedy trial date is properly chargeable is an ad hoc inquiry’.” (quoting People v. Scales,763 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1988)) (emphasis in original)). In addressing the trial court’s role, we look to whether its actions with regard to the applicable speedy trial provision were reasonable under the facts of the case before it. See e.g.People  ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 592 (Colo. 1997) (holding dismissal of charges necessary when trial court’s unreasonable refusal to try to appoint defense counsel who could appear within the speedy trial period caused the delay); Arledge, 938 P.2d at 167 (finding that recused trial judge acted inappropriately when he obtained a speedy trial waiver instead of immediately dispatching the case for reassignment).

In order to determine whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, it is necessary to make an ad hoc judgment based on the facts of each case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971); Potter v. District Court, supra.  Factors to be considered include length of delay, the reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and any prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, supra; Potter v. District Court, supra; People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P.2d 260 (1973).

ARGUMENT

Information 

Dismissal if defendant not fairly and reasonably informed of accusations. There must be a variance between the information and the proof to be offered constituting such an imperfection or inaccuracy that the defendant was not fairly and reasonably informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him in order that a motion of dismissal be granted. People v. Allen, 167 Colo. 158, 446 P.2d 223 (1968).

An information that fails to charge an essential element of an offense is substantively defectiveSee Cervantes, 715 P.2d at 786; People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269, 270 (Colo. 1983). This essential element requirement is satisfied if the language in the charge tracks the statutory language. See People v. Hunter, 666 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1983)People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 496, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971); Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 413, 444 F.2d 267, 269 (1968). “It is generally sufficient that the indictment [or information] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.’” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (188[1])).

Speedy Trial

Defendant, William Robert “Bramscher” Pro se asserts right to Speedy Trial.  A criminal defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; but he does have a responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981).  Right to a speedy trial has been formulated to force the prosecution to try a defendant promptly in compliance with the statutes, rules, and constitutional requirements of each case. People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975).

Speedy Trial pursuant C.R.S. 18-1-405 and pursuant to C.R.S. 24-60-501 ART III(a).   The right to a speedy trial is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by both the Colorado and United States Constitutions in essentially the same language (See Valdez v. People, 174 Colo. 2 68, 483 P2d 1333 (1971)Jaramillo v. Dist Ct, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P2d 1219 (1971)People v. Small, 177 Colo. 118, 493 P2d 15 (1972); Lucero v. People, 173 Colo. 94, 476 P2d 257 (1970)).

The right to a speedy trial is not only for the benefit of the accused, but also for the protection of the public.  It is essential that an early determination of guilt be made, so that the innocent may be exonerated and the guilty punished (Jaramillo, supra).  It is duty of prosecutor and trial judge to secure and protect the defendant’s right to speedy trial (See People v. Chavez, 779 P2d 375 (Colo. 1989)People v. Abeyta, Montoya & Santistevan, 195 Colo. 338, 578 P2d 645 (05/08/1/78)).

18-1-105(6)(a) and Federal Court Rules Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Part II, Chap 208 § 3161(1)(F),(G) establish time limits and exclusions.  Delays attributable to the court or the prosecutor that result in a trial date that falls past the applicable speedy trial deadline require the dismissal of charges against the defendant. C.M.C.R. 248(b). Such delays may include, for example, delays resulting from a prosecutor’s lack of diligence, a court’s congested docket, a court’s refusal to set trial within the speedy trial period after granting prosecutor’s motion for continuance, a court’s refusal to timely select a new venue, a court’s dilatory ruling, or a prosecutor’s untimely actions. See Arledge, 938 P.2d at 165-66.

Bad-faith investigation

“The Pillar of Liberty Erected by Fourth Amendment Cannot Be Knocked Down in Aid of Law Enforcement” citing United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles (1931, CA2 NY) 52 F2d 49.  A complaint standing alone will not support an arrest warrant [summons] where NO facts are set forth to establish probable cause.” (See Sergeant v. People, 177 Colo 354, 497 P2d 983 (1972).

Omissions of material fact (see Stewart v. Donges, 915 F2d 572, 582-83 (10th Cir 1990)) were knowingly, intentionally and recklessly made with disregard for the truth on the part of affiant-officer Denver Police Detective D. Diaz Deleon #P04405.  False statements in affidavits must be stricken from the affidavit under the Fourth Amendment USC (see People v. Winden, 689 P2d 578, 582 (Colo 1984)) and misleading statements and omissions or material facts must be examined to determine if these falsehoods resulted in an erroneous finding of probable cause (See United States v. MartinCruse v. State, 584 P2d 1141 Alaska (1978)People v. Kurland, 28 CAL 3d 376, 618 P2d 213, 168 CAL RPTR 667 (1980), cert denied, 451 US 987, 101 S Ct 2321, 68 L Ed 2d 844 (1981)).

Vindictive prosecution & Malicious prosecution

A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.  (see e.g., People v. Walker, 180 Colo 84, 504 P2d 1098 (1972) in re “A prosecutors duty is to seek justice, not merely convict”; People v. Drake, 841 P2d 364 (Colo App 1992); see also, People v. Elliston, 181 Colo 118, 508 P2d 379 (1973) in re “A prosecutor must be careful in his conduct to ensure that the jury tries a case solely on the basis of the facts presented to it.”).  Specifically in the CRPC Rule 3.8 the prosecutor in a criminal case shall (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause (http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/22193).

“Prosecutorial vindictiveness is defined as vengeful prosecution for the recovery of damages to person, property, of reputation, shown to have approximately resulted from a previous civil or criminal proceeding, which was commenced or continued without probable cause, but with vengeance, and which has terminated unsuccessfully (See Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., 47 F. Supp. 290, 293 (D.N.Y. 1942))

A vindictive prosecution – one in which the prosecutor seeks to punish the defendant for exercising a protected statutory and constitutional right – violates a defendants Fifth Amendment right to Due Process. (See United States v. Jenkins, 537 F3d 1, 3 (1st Cir 2008)).  Indeed, courts have long abided the “uncontroversial principle” that “to punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a Due Process violation ‘of the most basic sort’.” (See United States v. Goodwin, 457 US 368, 372, 102 S Ct 2485, 73 L Ed 2d 74 (1982) quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 363, 98 S Ct 663, 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978)).  Of course, “The very purpose of instituting criminal proceedings against an individual is to punish; therefore the mere presence of a punitive motivation behind prosecutorial action does not render such action constitutionally volatile.” (See United States v. Goodwin, 576 F Supp. 2d 235, 237 (D.P.R. 2008)).  Thus, a defendant may be penalized for violating the law, but not punished for exercising his rights.  (See Goodwin, supra, 457 US at 372; United States v. Tobin, 598 F Supp. 2d 125, 02/18/2009)).

Judicial misconduct

The right to criticize public officials (see New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 273, II L Ed 2d 686, 84 S Ct 710 (1964)) and to petition the government for a redress of grievances protected activities (see United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 US 217, 222, 19 L Ed 2d 426, 88 S Ct 353 (1967)); see Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 75 L Ed 2d 708, 103 S Ct 1684 (1983) (“public concern”) whereas “The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,” Id. at 145 (see also Roth v. United States, 354 US 476, 484, 1 L Ed 2d 1498, 77 S Ct 1304, 14 OHIO Ops 2d 331 (1957)).

Citing New York Times v. Sullivansupra, “Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error.  Where judicial officers are involved, [the US Supreme Court] has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment {376 U.S. 273} as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision.

Citing Hustler Magazine & Larry C. Flynt v. Jerry Falwell, 485 US 46, 99 L Ed 2d 41, 108 S Ct 876 [no 86-1278] 02/24/88, “Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United States, 522 U.S. 655, 673-674, 88 L Ed 1525, 64 S Ct 1240 (1944), when he said that “[O]ne of the prerogatives of American Citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.”  Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to “Vehement, Casuistic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”  “[T]he candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry ‘foul’ when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts {485 US 52} to demonstrate the contrary.  (See also Monitor Patriot Co v. Roy (1971)).

The role of the Judiciary, if its integrity is to be maintained, is one of impartiality.  (See People v. Marinez, 185 Colo. 187 (1974); Cannon 1, Colorado Code of Ethics (1973)).  The Judge who presides over civil and criminal cases should be fair, unbiased and completely impartial.  Any bias, hostility or prejudice or even interest in the outcome of a given civil or criminal case will disqualify a judge from presiding over that case.  (See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510, 47 S Ct 437, 71 L Ed 749 (1927); Whitaker v. McClean, 73 APP DC 259, 118 F2d 596  (1941); Cf. Berger v. United States, 255 US 22, 65 L Ed 481, 41 S Ct 230 (1921); Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11 (1954).

Billy bob Bramscher petitions the Judges conduct case 14GS000200 displayed a deep-seated favoritism and antagonism that would make fair judgments impossible.  Billy bob Bramscher makes claim that the trial courts decisions were manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair and the trial court failed to articulate a reason for some decisions and not such reason was readily apparent from the record or the Judges articulated reasons which had no basis in fact or the reason so articulated is contrary to law.  (See In Re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582-83 (D Colo. 2000); Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments, 980 P2d 973, 977 (Colo. 1999) in re “trial court’s broad discretion to act in a “managerial role”); CRCP 16 Committee cmt. in re “It is expected that trial judges will assertively lead the management of cases to ensure justice is served.”)

Pursuant to Colorado Court Rules CRCivilP Chap. 20 251.4 “it is the duty of the judge to report misconduct or disability of counsel.  A most sacred duty is to maintain the integrity of the law profession by disciplining lawyers who indulge in practices which are designed to perpetrate a fraud of the courts.”  (See People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P2d 951 (1971)).

CONCLUSION

Information

It is an adjudicated fact that the charges fail to identify the particular statement(s) or assertion(s) alleged to be harassing or threatening also failing to identify any alleged victims. See Fueston, 717 P.2d 978 (Fueston I) (to charge the crime of offering a false instrument for recording, the information must identify the statements alleged to be false), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 749 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1988) (Fueston II); cf. Westendorf, 37 Colo. App. 111, 112-03, 542 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1975) (perjury indictment must identify the statements alleged to be false).  If complaint fails to charge crime, court acquires no jurisdiction. See People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726 (1980).

The Summons and Complaint FATALLY fails to comply with Fourth Amendment, USC and this court has no jurisdiction of this case and/or defendant.

Crim. P. 203(a), Crim. P. 204(b)(4), Fifth AmendmentFourteenth Amendment, Crim. P. 7(b)(1), Section 16-5-202(1), C.R.S. (2013) Crim. P. 7(b)(2) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c).

Speedy Trial

Delays attributable to the court or the prosecutor that result in a trial date that falls past the applicable speedy trial deadline require the dismissal of charges against the defendant. C.M.C.R. 248(b). Such delays may include, for example, delays resulting from a prosecutor’s lack of diligence, a court’s congested docket, a court’s refusal to set trial within the speedy trial period after granting prosecutor’s motion for continuance, a court’s refusal to timely select a new venue, a court’s dilatory ruling, or a prosecutor’s untimely actions. See Arledge, 938 P.2d at 165-66.

The accused, William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher has been denied the constitutional right to SPEEDY TRIAL (See Falgout v. People, 170 Colo. 32, 459 P2d 572, (1969); People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189, 512 P2d (1973); People v. Buggs, 186 Colo. 13, 525 P2d 421 (1974); Gefland v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 586 P2d 1331 (1978)) and “If the constitution, the statutes, the rules or case law require dismissal, it is the duty of the trial court to order that the case be dismissed” (Coca, supra)  and “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law” from the Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article II, Bill of Rights; see also PV v. District Court, 609 P. 2d 110, 199 Colo. 357 (1978)).

Monetary Damages Requested

“Every person is generally presumed to know the law” (Carey, supra; People v. Hayward, 55 P3d 803 (Colo. App 2002); Dikeman v. Charnes, 739 P2d 870 (Colo. App 1987).  “Probable cause for arrest [summons] is a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently set forth to establish probable cause” (Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, (93 L Ed 1879, P2d 983 (1949)).

42 USC § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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One thought on “Notice of Claim C.R.S. 24-10-109 Denver City and County, Colorado

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