(Dishonorable Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler)
RAPE CULTURE USA
William Robert “Billy bob” Bramscher
“All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope.” ~Winston Churchhill
On 10 August 2016 Dishonorable Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler pursuant Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32 Sentence and Judgment, did ILLEGALLY SENTENCE Austin James Wilkerson in violation of our Federal Constitution, Colorado State Constitution as well as Butlers’ oath of office. Wilkerson was convicted of a 3rd Degree Felony which mandated by the Colorado Legislature requires a minimum 4 years prison yet Dishonorable Judge Patrick Butler only sentenced convicted rapist Wilkerson to probation.
The following discourse will explore statute, rule, constitution and case law proving Dishonorable Judge Patrick Butler is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a Colorado judge or anyone in position of authority held to protect our citizens and country from tyranny.
II. The Right to Petition
The following PETITION is on behalf and for The People of The State of Colorado. The right to petition the Government is part of our heritage from earliest times and represents a cornerstone of our national liberty. It is a right long-recognized as implicit in “[t]he very idea of a government republican in form.” United States v. Cruikshank, 1975, 92 U.S. 542. See also McDonald v. Smith, 1985, 472 U.S. 479.
Boulder, Colorado, District Judge Patrick Butler did willfully, negligently as-well-as illegally commit “outrageous governmental conduct” in violation the United States Federal Constitution, the Colorado Constitution, Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct and the Laws of God. See also Mapp v. Ohio, U.S.1961, 367 U.S. 643 (Government’s “failure to observe its own laws”).
The granting or denial of probation and the conditions of probation are subject to appellate review when granted contrary to the provisions of C.R.S. 16-11-101 (2016) and so on. See People v. Fleming, App.1999 CO, 3 P.3d 449. A defendant who is not statutorily eligible for probation involves a ministerial act on the part of the trial judge. This is an ILLEGAL SENTENCE. The Colorado Supreme Court held in Burns v. District Court (1983): “Defining crimes and prescribing punishments are legislative prerogatives. A court may not impose a sentence that is inconsistent with the terms specified by statutes.” (Emphasis added) See C.R.S. 16-11-101, (1973)(1978 Repl. Vol 8)(1982 Cum. Supp.). See also People v. District Court of City and County of Denver, 1983 CO, 673 P.2d 991 (“Defining crimes and prescribing punishments are legislative prerogatives, and court may not impose sentence that is inconsistent with terms specified by statutes.”).
The Colorado Supreme Court has the power and duty to correct a criminal sentence that is not authorized by statute. See People v. Isom, 2015 COA 89 —P.3d—, 2015 WL 4035115.
III. SENTENCING IN CRIMINAL CASES
Austin James Wilkerson is currently serving an ILLEGAL SENTENCE. An ILLEGAL SENTENCE is one that is not authorized by law, meaning that it is inconsistent with the legislative scheme that has been established by the legislature. People v. Wenzinger, 2006 COA, 155 P.3d 415, 418. Claims that a sentence was not authorized by law may be raised at any time. People v. Bowerman, 2010 COA, 258 P.3d 314. 316. Whether the trial court correctly determined the statutorily authorized sentencing range is an issue of law that the Colorado Supreme Court reviews de novo. People v. Everett, 2010 COA, 250 P.3d 649, 663.
The Daily Camera Boulder News are seemingly idiots reporting on 11 August 2016 this caption “Is Colorado[s’] indeterminate sentencing law keeping rapists out of prision?” yet clearly the Colorado Legislature has defined the mandatory punishment for Austin James Wilkersons’ sentencing:
C.R.S. 18-1.3-401. Felonies classified – presumptive penalties
(1) (a) (V) (A) Except as otherwise provided in section 18-1.3-401.5 for offenses contained in article 18 of this title committed on or after October 1, 2013, as to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:
Class 1: Minimum Life imprisonment – Maximum Death + no parole
Class 2: Minimum 8 years imprisonment – Maximum 24 years imprisonment + 5 years parole
Class 3: Minimum 4 years imprisonment – Maximum 12 years imprisonment + 5 years parole
Class 4: Minimum 2 years imprisonment – Maximum 6 years imprisonment + 3 years parole
Class 5: Minimum 1 year imprisonment – Maximum 3 years imprisonment + 2 years parole
Class 6: Minimum 1 year imprisonment – Maximum 18 months imprisonment + 1 year parole
According to The Daily Camera Boulder News, “District Judge Patrick Butler sentenced former University of Colorado student Austin Wilkerson to 20 years to life on probation and two years of work or school release after Wilkerson was convicted of sexual assault on a physically helpless victim and unlawful sexual contact for raping a female student after prosecutors say she had too much to drink at a 2014 St. Patrick’s Day party.”
“Probation” is merely a conditional suspension of a custodial sentence; it is a matter of grace, the purpose of which is to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender, United States v. Myers, W.D.Wich.S.Div.1992, 799 F.Supp. 790, and foster offenders’ re-entry into society, not to punish. United States v. Jones, C.A.7.Ill.2015, 2015 WL 4934582; 18 U.S.C.A. s3551. See also Logan v. People For Use of Alamosa County, 1958 CO, 332 P.2d 897 (Purpose of probation is educational and reconstructive rather than primarily punitive or oppressive).
C.R.S. 18-1.3-202. Probationary power of court
(1) When it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be served thereby, the court may grant the defendant probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it deems best. The length of probation shall be subject to the discretion of the court and may exceed the maximum period of incarceration authorized for the classification of the offense of which the defendant is convicted but shall not exceed five years for any misdemeanor or petty offense. If the court chooses to grant the defendant probation, the order placing the defendant on probation shall take effect upon entry and, if any appeal is brought, shall remain in effect pending review by an appellate court unless the court grants a stay of probation pursuant to section 16-4-201, C.R.S. Unless an appeal is filed that raises a claim that probation was granted contrary to the provisions of this title, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of adjudicating complaints filed against the defendant that allege a violation of the terms and conditions of probation. In addition to imposing other conditions, the court has the power to commit the defendant to any jail operated by the county or city and county in which the offense was committed during such time or for such intervals within the period of probation as the court determines. The aggregate length of any such commitment whether continuous or at designated intervals shall not exceed ninety days for a felony, sixty days for a misdemeanor, or ten days for a petty offense unless it is a part of a work release program pursuant to section 18-1.3-207. That the defendant submit to commitment imposed under this section shall be deemed a condition of probation.
(2) The probation department in each judicial district may enter into agreements with any state agency or other public agency, any corporation, and any private agency or person to provide supervision or other services for defendants placed on probation by the court. The agreements shall not include management of any intensive supervision probation programs created pursuant to section 18-1.3-208
IV. ILLEGAL SENTENCE
The sentencing judge, Dishonorable Judge Patrick Butler, has the power and duty to correct a criminal sentence that is not authorized by statute and he may do so at anytime. See e.g. Lucero v. People, 2012 CO 7, 272 P.3d 1063; People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, 316 P.3d 25.
A. Outrageous Governmental Conduct
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) has recognized the existence of “outrageous governmental conduct” in United States v. Russell, 1973, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 and Colorado has recognized the due process claim in Bailey v. People, 1981, 630 P.2d 1062, People v. Medina, App.2001, 51 P.3d 1006 and People v. Johnson, App.1998, 987 P.2d 855.
When this claim is appropriately raised, a supervising court must determine if there has been “outrageous governmental conduct” by reviewing the totality of the facts in a given case or cases. See People in Interest of M.N., 1988, 761 P.2d 1124, 1129. Such conduct, which justifies the exercise of the courts’ (e.g. Colorado Supreme Court) in correcting substantive and procedural errs is generally defined as that which violates fundamental fairness and is shocking to the universal sense of justice. See e.g. People v. Auld, App.1991, 815 P.2d 956.
B. Fraud Upon The Court
Fraud upon the court is defined in terms of its effect on the judicial process, not in terms of the content of a particular misrepresentation, concealment or ministerial act. Fraud upon the court must involve more than one inquiry to a single litigant; it is limited to fraud that “seriously” affects the integrity of the normal substantial and procedural processes. Fraud upon the court is limited to fraud that does, or at least attempts to “defile the court itself” or that is perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases. See 12 Moore’s Federal Practice s 60.21[a] at 52-60 (3d ed.1997). A fraud upon the court is one that interferes with the judicial machinery itself. See Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Cache Creek Mining Trust, 1993, 854 P.2d 167. See also In re Marriage of Glover, Ind.App.2000, 723 N.E.2d 924.
C. Abuse of Discretion
Abuse of discretion is an “adjudicator’s failure to exercise sound, reasonable and legal decision-making. An appellate court’s [e.g. Colorado Supreme Court] standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014). A trial court abuses its discretion where its rulings are “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair”, People v. Stewart, 2002 CO, 55 P.3d 107, 122, or where they are based on an erroneous view of the law. People v. Wadle, 2004 CO, 97 P.3d 932, 936. See also People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, 351 P.3d 431.
D. Malicious Abuse of Process
Malicious abuse of process is the “improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014).
V. INTERPRETATION OF SENTENCING STATUTES
The interpretation of statutes is a question of law subject to de novo review. Hendricks v. People, 2000 CO, 10 P.3d 1231. Whether a sentence is authorized by statue also presents a question of law that the supervising court reviews de novo. Lucero, supra; People v. Torrez, supra.
In construing a statue, the Colorado Supreme Court must ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent, which is to be discerned, when possible, from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. Longoria, 1993 CO, 862 P.2d 266. Constructions that defeat the obvious legislative intent should be avoided, and, where possible, a statue must be read and considered as a whole and interpreted to give consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts. People v. District Court, 1986 CO, 713 P.2d 918. The Colorado Supreme Court presumes that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and the Colorado Supreme Court will not follow a statutory construction that defeats the legislative intent or leads to an unreasonable or absurd result. People v. Drake, App.1999 CO, 983 P.2d 135.
When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed as written, without resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction. People v. Zapotocky, 1994 CO, 869 P.2d 1234. If, however, the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court may apply rules of statutory construction to determine the construction that accords with the objective of the legislation. People v. Terry, 1990 CO, 791 P.2d 374. If the language of the state is ambiguous or in conflict with other provisions, the Court then looks to legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. People v. Luther, 2002 CO, 58 P.3d 1013.
As relevant now, a person who is convicted of 3rd Degree Felony is required by Colorado Legislature mandate to a minimum of four (4) years with the Colorado Department of Community Corrections. A court is not free to disregard a specific legislative mandate related to sentencing. People v. Wilder, 1984 CO, 687 P.2d 452, 453 (citing People v. Widhalm, 1982 CO, 642 P.2d 498, 500); Cf. Adair v. People, 1982 CO, 651 P.2d 389 (reaffirming Widhalm). Defining crimes and prescribing punishments are legislative prerogatives. People v. Morensen, 1993 COA, 856 P.2d 45; People v. District Court of City and County of Denver, supra (citing People v. Hinchman, 1979 CO, 196 Colo. 526, 589 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2883, 61 L.Ed.2d 311). See also Lucero v. People, 2012 CO, 272 P.1063 (“Sentences that are inconsistent with the statutory scheme outlined by the legislature are illegal”)(quoting People v. Rockwell, 2005 CO, 125 P.3d 410, 414); People v. Hard, 2014 COA, 342 P.3d 572)(same); People v. Deroulet, 2002 CO, 48 P.3d 520, 526 (“[P]reserving the primacy of the General Assembly * * * *).
VI. Equal Protection Claim
The female victim in this case, as a threshold matter, possesses this constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection of the laws mandating like treatment of persons who are similarly situated. See e.g. People v. Mendoza, 2011 COA, 313 P.3d 637, 642, 2011 WL 4837499; People v. Watkins, 2005 COA, 126 P.3d 309, 311. To state a claim for an Equal Protection violation, the victim must establish that guilty defendant Austin James Wilkerson was treated differently from similarly situated individuals. Cf. Mendoza, supra; People v. Friesen, 2001 COA, 45 P.3d 784, 785.
VII. CALL TO ACTION
As reported by the Daily Camera 12 August 2016, “Petition seeks recall of judge in Austin Wilkerson case. But Judges can’t be recalled in Colorado” is an incorrect interpretation of the law yet proves this overwhelming shock of injustice by concerned citizens.
Please apply the following resources for maximum effort:
A. Boulder County District Attorney
The Boulder County District Attorney is obligated to file petition with the Colorado Supreme Court applying Colorado Appellate Rules (C.A.R.). The Colorado Supreme Court has plenary authority to promulgate and interpret the rules of criminal procedure. Colo. Const. art. VI s 21; Peterson v. People, 2005 CO, 113 P.3d 706, 708; People v. Angel, 2012 CO 34, 277 p.3d 231, 234. The Colorado Supreme Court employs the same interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction to construe a rule of criminal procedure. Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO, 291 P.3d 16, 20. The Colorado Supreme Court will first read the language of the rule consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning, and, if it is unambiguous, Court they will apply the rule as written. Angel, supra. The rules of criminal procedure “shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” Crim. P. 2.
C.A.R. 21. Procedure in Original Actions.
(a) Original Jurisdiction Under the Constitution.
(1) This rule applies only to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue writs as provided in Section 3 of Article VI of the Colorado Constitution and to the exercise of the Supreme Court’s general superintending authority over all courts as provided in Section 2 of Article VI of the Colorado Constitution. Relief under this rule is extraordinary in nature and is a matter wholly within the discretion of the Supreme Court. Such relief shall be granted only when no other adequate remedy, including relief available by appeal or under C.R.C.P. 106, is available.
(2) Petitions to the Supreme Court in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto, injunction, prohibition and other forms of writs cognizable under the common law are subject to this rule. The petitioner need not designate a specific form of writ when seeking relief under this rule.
B. The People
First and foremost contact District Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial District Stanley L. Garnett Boulder County, Colorado, by telephone at 303.441.3700 encouraging this public servant to perform his duties and file with the Colorado Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21.
Second, go to the website of the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation (COOJPE) and file your own Citizen Feedback on Colorado Judges form sharing your belief and knowledge that Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler is Dishonorable.
Third, telephone the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (CCJD) at 303.457.5131 and then file a formal complaint against Dishonorable Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler. Honestly, this group CCJD is worthless as I may personally attest from my experiences working with William J. Campbell, Executive Director.
Fourth, contact Governor John Hickenlooper demanding executive action as required by his position and duties. Telephone the Office of Constituent Services Governor’s Office Front Desk at 303.866.2471 sharing your belief and knowledge that Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler is Dishonorable.
Dishonorable Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler is not impartial or independent unable to fulfill his duties and oath. With specific intent Butler did violate the statutes, rules, constitution and case laws. Dishonorable Boulder District Judge Patrick Butlers’ action’s as a public servant are outrageous governmental conduct.
 An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.
 Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.
 The Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct establishes standards for the ethical conduct of judges and judicial candidates. It is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of judges and judicial candidates, who are governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical standards as well as by the Code. The Code is intended, however, to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and personal conduct, and to provide a basis for regulating their conduct through disciplinary agencies.